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The territorial sovereign state is the primary unit of International Relations. In this thesis, it is argued 
that its perceived dominance in the ‘real’ world out there has also come to dominate the political as 
well as the academic field as the only imaginable spatial extension of political authority. The 
mainstream of IR can only analyse questions of how the territorial state functions in the international 
system, not how the state comes to dominate social life as a territorial form of political authority. 
The purpose of this thesis is to reimagine the state and territoriality in International Relations. To this 
end, inspired by political geography and sociology, alternate conceptualisations of space and the state 
are suggested. They can be used to form a basis for analysis of sociospatial phenomena that takes into 
account the social as well as the spatial, and starts with human agency, not structure. In chapter four 
I then build on these conceptualisation to suggest ways to analyse state power as ascending from local 
social relations, and the territorialisation strategies and effects that make political authority territorial. 
Viewed as an effect, the territorial state is but one possible form of sociospatial organisation of 
political authority, although it does currently have the strongest international acceptance for its source 
of sovereignty. Nevertheless, competing political authorities can employ supporting, parallel, or 
competing systems of rule with the state that can be territorial, but also, for example, network-, 
kinship- or mobility-based. The making of political authorities and their spatialities is demonstrated 
with cases from the Sino-Burmese borderlands.  
The cases build on fieldworks conducted by ethnographers, anthropologists, and political geographers. 
The focus of the analysis is on the territorialisation of political authority, especially of the Burmese 
state, in spaces with competing spatial claims for authority. The cases demonstrate that international 
borders tell little about the realities on the field; state territory and power are constantly renegotiated 
and redefined by actors varying from armed groups, state military, central and local government 
officials, drug lords, businessmen and ordinary farmers. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Aluevaltio on kansainvälisen politiikan perusyksikkö. Tämän tutkimuksen mukaan valtion dominoiva 
asema käytännön kansainvälisessä politiikassa on johtanut siihen, että myös akateemisessa 
tutkimuksessa siitä on tullut poliittisen auktoriteetin ainoa kuviteltavissa oleva tilallinen muoto. 
Kansainvälisen politiikan valtavirta pystyy vastaamaan vain kysymyksiin siitä, miten aluevaltiot 
toimivat kansainvälisissä suhteissa, mutta ei siihen, miten valtio muodostuu sosiaalisissa suhteissa 
niiden toimintaa määrääväksi alueelliseksi poliittisen auktoriteetin muodoksi. 
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on kuvitella valtio ja alueellisuus uudelleen kansainvälisen politiikan 
tieteenalalla. Tätä tavoitetta varten tutkimuksessa ehdotetaan poliittisen maantieteen ja sosiologian 
 
 
käsitteisiin perustuvia tilan ja valtion käsitteitä. Näitä käsitteitä voidaan hyödyntää 
sosiaalistilallisessa tutkimuksessa, joka ottaa huomioon fyysisen tilan ja sosiaalisten suhteiden 
keskinäiskonstituution sekä ottaa lähtökohdakseen ihmisen toiminnan rakenteen sijasta. Kappaleessa 
neljä näitä tilan ja valtion käsitteitä hyödynnetään määriteltäessä alueellisuutta ja valtion valtaa. 
Valtion vallan oletetaan syntyvän paikallisista sosiaalisista suhteista ja vallankäytön tilojen 
keskinäisistä suhteista nousevana ilmiönä. Poliittisen auktoriteetin alueellisuus taas käsitetään 
alueellistamisstrategioiden vaikutuksena (effect). 
Valtio käsitetään tässä tutkimuksessa rakenteellisten prosessien vaikutuksena. Näin käsitettynä 
aluevaltio näyttäytyy yhtenä mahdollisena poliittisen auktoriteetin sosiaalistilallisena muotona. 
Aluevaltion erottaa muista kilpailevista poliittisen auktoriteetin muodoista se, että kansainvälisesti 
sitä pidetään ainoana suvereenina muotona. Poliittinen auktoriteetti voi kuitenkin olla myös muuta 
kuin alueellista, kuten esimerkiksi verkostoihin, samankaltaisuuteen tai mobiilisuuteen perustuvaa. 
Poliittisten auktoriteettien tilallisuuden muotoutumista ja kilpailua demonstroidaan tutkimuksessa 
Kiinan ja Myanmarin rajaseutujen tapausten kautta. 
Käsitellyt tapaustutkimukset perustuvat etnografien, antropologien ja poliittisten maantieteilijöiden 
tekemiin kenttätutkimuksiin Kiinassa ja Myanmarissa. Tapaukset keskittyvät poliittisen auktoriteetin, 
erityisesti Myanmarin valtion auktoriteetin, alueellistumiseen raja-alueiden tilassa, jossa on 
kilpailevia tilallisia poliittisen auktoriteetin muotoja. Tapaukset tulitaukosopimuksista, 
huumekaupasta ja maansiirroista osoittavat, että kansainväliset rajaviivat kertovat vain vähän eletystä 
todellisuudesta, jossa valtion alueellisuus ja valtio täytyy neuvotella ja määritellä jatkuvasti uudelleen. 
Tähän prosessiin osallistuvat mitä erilaisimmat toimijat valtion armeijasta, valtion virkamiehistä ja 
aseistetuista ryhmistä aina liikemiehiin, huumelordeihin ja tavallisiin maanviljelijöihin. 
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POLITICS VS. ETYMOLOGY OF A NAME: MYANMAR OR BURMA? 
There is much confusion as well as political weight in the application of the name of the Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar (the current official name); many know the country by the name Burma but 
the official name is Myanmar. The name Myanmar is used for example in the UN setting. However, 
the UK (see e.g. https://www.gov.uk/government/world/burma) and the US (see U.S. Department of 
State 2014) use the name Burma. EU uses the name Myanmar/Burma but for example in office names 
(like the EU External Action Service office) the name Myanmar is applied (see e.g. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/index_en.htm). So what should be used in this study? 
Whether to use the name Myanmar (derived from myanma) or Burma (derived from bama) is a 
political choice more than anything else. Etymologically the names mean the same thing; the ethnic 
majority group living for the most part in the lowlands of the country. Both of them have been used 
interchangeably long before the colonial period, myanma however in more formal settings than bama. 
However, during the colonial period the words were used to refer to the colonial Burma that consisted 
of multiple ethnicities whereas the word originally meant only one ethnic group. This is true for both 
the name Myanmar as well as Burma; the country and the “Burmese nation” are a colonial creation. 
There is no original word in Burmese that would refer to the whole population consisting different 
ethnicities. (Lintner n.d.) 
So when the nationalist movement in the 1930’s decided on whether to call the country Burma or 
Myanmar, the choice was merely between two words with different pronunciations but the same 
meaning (Lintner n.d.). Their interpretation was that Burma referred to the country as a whole and in 
1948, the country was given the name Union of Burma to encourage national unity. The military 
junta’s interpretation was the opposite and after the military coup in 1988, the junta changed the name 
of the country to the Union of Myanmar. Their reading was that the name Burma reflected the colonial 
rule and the name Myanmar would give the nation more unity and independence. The name change 
has been contested by the opposition because it was done by the junta that did not come to power in 
democratic ways and thus had no authority to change the name. (Kipgen 2013.) 
The military coup was condemned in the Western world and financial aid and loans were frozen and 
heavy sanctions were put on the country. Most Western countries also continued to call the country 
Burma as the junta was not deemed a legitimate ruler of the country. After the junta stepped down 
and the country started opening up, the name Myanmar has become more popular and accepted to 
use by the international community like the UN (Kipgen 2013). However, there still is uneasiness 
about which name to use (see e.g. Perry 2014; Schiavenza 2014), especially as the speed of reforms 
v 
 
has slowed down and the government is reluctant to address the worsening situation of the Rohingya 
Muslim minority. 
The focus of this thesis is in the years of military rule and the time after the opening up of the country 
and therefore, following David I. Steinberg (2001, xi–xii), I will use the name Myanmar for the most 
part. However, when times before the name change are discussed, the name Burma will be used. The 
term Burman will be used to refer to a person belonging to the ethnic majority, Burmese to any citizen 
of the country and when talking about national policies. The intention behind the choices is to make 
them as unpolitical as possible while at the same time reserving the readability of the text; Myanmar 
is the official name and therefore it is used but the use of Myanma, the adjective derived from 
Myanmar, tends to make text difficult to understand. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Indisputably, the rise of China is one of the biggest issues of our time that has even been called the 
Chinese century. The US-led world we have known, if not loved, is changing. No matter which 
International Relations scholar you might ask, China is bound to play a role in their predictions about 
the future be their theory of choice neorealism or democracy theory. The influence of Chinese choices 
and policies affect an ever larger part of the world from heroin addicts in Southeast Asia, investors in 
Africa, to diplomats in the UN.  The rise of China in mere 30 years from a poor rural country to the 
banker of the world and the roaring dragon of economic miracles has been astonishing to most of the 
world. FDI from the developed world has poured in China, making its industrial reformation possible. 
Now China is becoming a major source of ODI itself and is gaining more and more influence and 
foothold in the international economy, especially since the US and Europe have been crippled by the 
financial crisis of 2007/8 and the economic and social crisis that followed. The seemingly endless 
growth and expansion of the Chinese economy is a glimmer of hope for the world economy in crisis 
but it has created also a lot of anxiety and fear of China taking over the world with soft power created 
by its bottomless pockets filled with foreign reserves. 
How then, to study this new power in the global game of states? Should one look at the material and 
economic power of the dragon, and try to understand whether its rise will be a dangerous one? What 
about the soft power of China, is it challenging or accommodating current norms and regimes, or will 
it bring about a new collection of Chinese norms? Litres after litres of ink have already been spilled 
while trying to understand China, and to predict the future of the international system/society in which 
it is a major material and ideational player. Some predict a China threat (see e.g. Rapkin & Thompson 
2003; Kugler 2006; Goldstein 2007; Mearsheimer 2001; 2006), predict a future of rivalry and 
insecurity in an Asia that resembles pre-1945 Europe (Evans 2011, 88), some assimilation due to 
economic consideration (Moore and Yang 2001; Scobell 2001), some (Economy 2001; Taylor 2006) 
a danger to the Western-built international community and its democratic and rights-based norms, 
and others (Johnston 2003; Foot & Walter 2013, Chan et al. 2008; Kent 2007; Chen 2009; Bijian 
2005) an assimilating dragon.  
Crudely said, the IR discussion is divided to two camps; those who predict a China threat and those 
who predict a peaceful rise, be it in material or ideational terms. China is taken to be just another 
Western-style hegemon rising to power (see e.g. Schweller & Pu 2010; Friedberg 2005). From 
(neo)realist and neoliberal accounts to constructivist ones, all states are treated as actors that exist 
prior to interaction, and therefore have corporate identities that make them essentially the same, only 
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situational and contextual interests might vary. The world is made of territorial states and those states 
are in rivalry for primacy, be it material or ideational, to step in the hierarchy of power. (Agnew 2010, 
571–572.) To me, this, albeit fairly typical IR setting, seems limited. It takes China as well as the 
international system/community as fairly static. World history runs its similar course through the 
passive space and there is not much we can do about it. All states are the same except for their relative 
power, institutions that possess “a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and the ability to 
extract tax revenues in a given territorial space”, like Max Weber has it defined and that acts as the 
basis for most of IR research, excluding Marxist conceptualisation (Biersteker 2013, 247). I could not 
see how this could help me understand what interested me in China most; the working of the state 
outside of its territorial borders, especially in Myanmar, the new aid darling of the Western world. 
An alternative exists in the current literature (see e.g. Shambaugh 2004; Burman 2008; Buzan 2010; 
Chan 2010; Kang 2003; for critique, see Acharya 2003); to treat China as a case of exception, to 
which Western-based models of the international system/society don’t apply. Instead of the grand 
world narrative, these scholars their attention on regional and historic specifics. This unique China is 
based upon its imperial past, communism, and rejection of capitalism and cultural particularity, as if 
China had never been ‘tainted’ with Western concepts. This brings us closer to asking questions like 
what China is and how it comes to being, and transforms.  However, what this ‘China-exceptionalism’ 
fails to take into account is that the rise of China is happening in a world that has been shaped and 
institutionalised to a large degree by the US and ‘Western values’. No matter how different China is 
or is portrayed to be, if it wants to operate globally, it has to deal with the legacy of the what has been 
and still is in the world, such as discourses and practices about what it means to be a sovereign state. 
(Agnew 2010a, 570–572; 579.) This can be witnessed for example in how China strongly advocates 
for the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention, a strongly Western concept, and as the 
principles of neoliberal capitalism are applied in its trade and foreign policies. 
As I read more about what had been written on China and the state, I started noticing that most IR 
research assumes that the world is neatly divided states based on the principle of sovereignty as 
territorially distinct units that contain society within them and mark the borders of political authority. 
This has limited the discipline’s ability to imagine political authority that is not defined in territorial 
terms and left the nature of the state unquestioned. The extraterritoriality of Chinese companies that 
in China’s case are deemed often as mere extensions of the state and its policies are hard to analyse 
if state territoriality is simply assumed to exist in the world, or at least that it is unproblematic to 
utilise in academic exercises.  Finally I ended up asking questions like how does the state come into 
being. IR answers questions of how the system of states comes into being, and how it functions, but 
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does little to our understanding how the state comes into being as a territorial political authority. The 
purpose of this thesis then came to be to reimagine statehood and territoriality in alternative ways that 
allow for change and creation of political authorities.   
I argue that mainstream IR does little to our understanding how political authority, and its sociospatial 
extension, come into being, and as such, do not help us understand transformation. Mainstream IR, 
such as neorealism, institutionalism and even moderate constructivism, study the workings of the 
world that is comprised of certain, knowable parts. Their premises are different from each other, but 
what they have in common is the assumption that the world we are supposed to study is organised in 
territorial nation-states. This is very understandable, even somehow self-evident; these territorial 
states seem to exist in the world. They are loved, and killed and died for, and their power becomes 
apparent in the use of police force and the border control practices. The heads of states convene in 
the United Nations, and make decisions that affect the real lives of people. It seems impossible to 
imagine that life could be organised in any other way. However, the attempt to do so is not to depart 
from IR, and even less, to somehow deem existing literature irrelevant. It is just to ask different 
questions. I just wanted to try and see if I open up my sociospatial imagination in the context of the 
most important unit of study of IR, the state. 
In chapter two, I argue that the state, and especially its territoriality, has been left under-
conceptualised, and taken as an unproblematic given, or as a given because it is too difficult to think 
of it otherwise, even though it is the single most important actor in international relations. The state 
is taken as a self-evident actor that exists prior to interaction. Its most important quality is sovereignty 
because it guarantees the security of the inside of the state. As an aspect of sovereignty territory is 
thought to be an unproblematic aspect, a fixed and static unit of bordered space. Therefore, the 
constitution of territory is not of interest for the discipline, except its social construction by 
constructivist approaches. Even they remain agnostic about physical space and therefore the co-
constitution of the physical and the social is left outside of analyses. I argue that this is due to the 
uneasy attitude of IR to time and space, especially space. It is taken as a fixed, passive arena where 
social relations happen.  
In chapter three, time and space are defined in a way that takes them both as interrelated concepts 
that are both important; time cannot be valued over space or the other way around because all life 
exists and happens in time and space. Space is then defined as the co-existence of trajectories of 
processes of change. As such, it is always in a state of flux, always open. The trajectories that 
constitute space are both social and physical. To understand this, the co-constitution of physical and 
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social space is further elaborated on. On this conceptualisation, I build my argument that the state, 
instead of an unproblematic actor, should be analysed as an effect of structural processes that make 
the state appear as a structure above society, organising and controlling the lives of people. However, 
as an effect, it is actually everyday practices and discourses happening in society that make the state 
appear in social relations. Although here I speak of the state, any form of political authority are 
constituted like this but what makes the state different in our time is the powerful discourse of 
sovereignty that makes territorial nation-states seen as the only legitimate sources of ultimate political 
authority. However, even this sovereignty has to be made to work in practice, in the material and 
social world. Understanding time, space and state like this means accepting that there are multiple, 
heterogeneous truths in the world, for example about the state. This can be scary, but necessary to 
admit if we want our theories to be able to relate to the world as it is lived, not only as it should work 
if things were eternal and absolute. 
In chapter four, I suggest some concepts to help analyse how the state comes into being in social 
relation through practices. First, I argue that scaling creates relations between spaces; for example 
state space can appear as ‘higher’ than for example the local scale. These relations between spaces in 
turn create power relations and fortify existing power structures, although they do have transformative 
potential as well. The scaled power can take various forms. I introduce two; despotic and 
infrastructural power following Merje Kuus and John Agnew’s (2008) adaption of Michael Mann’s 
(1984) concepts of state power. Despotic power refers to the  
In the remainder of the thesis, I showcase how the concepts could be applied in research. As my case 
I have chosen cross-border interactions between the Yunnan province in China and its neighbouring 
states of Kachin and Shan in Myanmar. If territory is thought of in terms of absolutes, borders and 
borderlands mark the success (or failure) of state territorialisation as they are key in regulating 
physical transnational flows (van Schendel 2005, 3). The Sino-Burmese borderlands provide an 
especially interesting example because the Burmese state was mapped and initially territorialised, 
although not fully, under the British colonial rule, whereas political authority in China has 
traditionally been centralised but not effectively territorialised. Currently, both countries embrace the 
principle of sovereignty and especially its aspect of non-interference. However, neither state has never 
really been able to maintain the border, but instead the people living in the area contest the border in 
their everyday life and practices. Especially upland people living in the mountains along the border 
of China and Myanmar have never effectively been under the control of the state. They have also 
engaged in cross-border travel as well as trade to some extent regardless of central government’s 
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control policies on either side of the border. The political authority of the Burmese government is 
also constantly contested by armed groups1 operating in the Kachin and Shan states.  
In chapter five I showcase some geographic issues, and especially economic and foreign policy 
relations between the Chinese central government and the governing regime in Myanmar as well as 
local contracts and partnerships between the Yunnan province and the Kachin and Shan states after 
the military take-over of Myanmar in 1988. This is a turning point in the relations of the two countries 
because the Western world set heavy economic and diplomatic sanctions on Myanmar and cut off 
new development assistance as did Japan (International Crisis Group 2009, 1). With the economic 
liberalization of China from 1978 onwards and the opening up of private sector in Myanmar following 
the military take-over in 1988, the cross-border activities have prominently increased. This is also 
when both states’ legit private sector, at least to some extent, started to grow and gain political leeway. 
To understand the Chinese business actors, both the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as private 
sector companies are introduced and their relations to the central government discussed.   
In chapter six, I utilise the concepts I have defined in earlier chapters to find the processes and 
struggles that create, maintain and/or diminish spatialities of political authorities in the Sino-Burmese 
borderlands. My focus is on the territorialisation of the Burmese state, following the rationale of my 
thesis to understand the making of the modern territorial state. Also territorialisation strategies of the 
Chinese state are showcased as well as alternative spatialities. I focus on three interrelated cases. First 
if ceasefire capitalism, a term introduced by Kevin Woods (2011) to describe the territorialisation of 
the Burmese state through business deals and land concessions. Second case is the cross-border drug 
trade and related anti-drug policies, through which especially Chinese businessmen have participated 
in the making of both armed group’s spatial authority making as well as the territorialisation the 
Burmese state to previously uncontrollable highlands by participating in anti-drug schemes financed 
by the Chinese state. The third case is closely related to the anti-drug schemes because they support 
rubber plantations in Myanmar that require land concessions.  
Out of the existing accounts of IR, my work resonates with critical theory and post-structuralism, 
especially with the work of R.J.B. Walker on dichotomies such as inside/outside and time/space. At 
                                                            
1 I try to avoid using the term ‘insurgency’ when talking about these groups, although it is the term often deployed when 
talking about the various armed groups operating in the Myanmar territory. Instead of insurgency, terms like armed group 
and conflict are utilised because the word insurgency is normatively-loaded and creates a sense of illegitimacy in contrast 
to legitimacy of the state (Brown 2010, 58). The problematic nature of this kind of setting is one of the carrying themes 
of this thesis and will be discussed in depth in section 4.3.  
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the same time it relates to pragmatist2  works in IR and the ethnographic turn3  that emphasises 
everyday practices and actions to avoid static state-centrism (Lie 2013, 202). However, I was not able 
to build merely on IR discussions on state, territory and sovereignty because most IR scholars either 
leave them, especially in regard to physical space, unanalysed or take only into account their social 
construction, remaining agnostic about the physical. Critical theorists who recognise the problems 
associated with the dominating concepts of state, territory and sovereignty have settled for criticising 
them but not really offering alternative conceptualisations. Therefore, I looked into writings from the 
disciplines of critical/political geography, ethnography, anthropology and to a lesser extent, sociology. 
Political geography provides me with conceptualisations of territory and territorialisation, as well as 
the recognition that boundaries are fluid and do not actually separate what they are claimed to separate, 
at least not in totality (Dean 2005, 809; 811). It also helps me see political organisation not as 
something that happens in somewhere, but also how that somewhere transforms that organisation. 
The essential question for this thesis is how does the state come to appear in social relations as a 
territorially organised structural power that constrains social life beneath it? The result, my hybrid 
conceptualisation of the state as an effect of structural practices, enables us to take a look at what has 
been silenced in the centre of IR research when state and territory have been taken as a given. It also 
opens space for emancipatory research; where as a structural statist view of the state would take 
people as passive objects, “waiting to be contained, controlled, disciplines or simply disposed by an 
all-pervasive state power” (Antonsich 2009, 800), taking the state as an effect produced in everyday 
practices relocates the power back to the people. 
                                                            
2 See e.g. Neumann (2002) and Schatzki et al. (2001).  
3 See Lie 2013 for discussion about the relationship of anthropology and IR, Neumann (2012) for ethnographic IR research. 
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2. ONCE UPON A TIME IN WESTPHALIA…  
The two most common definitions of the state, in academic as well as real life, are the principle of 
sovereignty and the Weberian conceptualisation of the state “as an institution that possesses a 
monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and the ability to extract tax revenues in a given 
territorial space” (Biersteker 2013, 247). From the Weberian point of view, the state has two aspects; 
the exercise of power through institutions and a clearly defined territory where it deploys that power. 
Within state borders, the state and society are related but outside the borders there is only relations 
between states. (Agnew 1994, 53–54.) They are governed by the principle of sovereignty that is 
defined in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States from 1933: “[t]he state as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population; 
b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states”. 
From the international law perspective then, the sovereign state is a territorial entity and within its 
geographical borders lives its population. Inside the borders the state governs its own affairs and 
society, minds its own business. This sovereign equality is one of the founding principles of the 
United Nations from which stems the idea of non-intervention4; all states were created equal and are 
as such to be left alone by other sovereigns.  
These definitions are so common and well-known that it almost sounds like stating obvious facts 
about the world when one sets out to define the state and sovereignty. However, the role of the 
territorial state in social theory, or in the world for that matter, has not always been what it is today. 
For example Marx and Engels did not take the state or society as a fixed tightly bounded entity but 
as something that was and would be influenced by various cross-border trajectories (Albrow 1997, 
45; cited in Lacher 2003, 531). At that time, the definition and positions position in social theory as 
well as the international society was still being negotiated in real life as well as in social sciences. 
Later, as the European modernist vision of territorial states in social sciences grew dominant, Marxist 
internationalism came to be seen as a subversion. The social sciences actually helped to facilitate the 
centralisation of the nation-state as the locus of sociospatial organisation of modern life. They were 
not reflectors or observers of that form of territorial organization of social life, but helped to legitimise 
it and delegitimise alternatives. (Lacher 2003, 523.) 
 
                                                            
4The Responsibility to Protect principle has challenged the principle of non-intervention in the last decades, which has 
generated a lot of discussion about the nature and future of sovereignty but this will be discussed later in this chapter; at 
this point, the focus is on what the world was taken to be in the mid-20th century. 
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Especially in the Western world, the principle of sovereignty was deemed important after the two 
World Wars because it legitimated of a preservation of a fixed territorial order of sovereign states as 
this was thought to be essential for preserving global stability (Murphy 1996, 83). For the 
emancipation movements in colonialized countries, the idea of the equality of sovereigns and the 
principle of non-intervention were practical rhetoric tools for realising their independence. The 
position of sovereignty was made to be the organising principle of relations, both in the political as 
well as in the academic sphere. At the same time, International Relations was still building its position 
as a discipline of its own, separate itself from political theory5. The practical rules of the US-led 
community of states were became defining rules of IR as well as it evolved in the context of the new 
world superpower (Guzzini 1998, x; 5). 
Sovereignty is the founding principle of the international order in the imagination of IR6  (Havercroft 
2011, 19). First of all, states were assumed to be equal and separate actors in the international society. 
Fixed territoriality became a founding aspect of the sovereign state that separated it from other states. 
Additionally, it separated the domestic order from the international anarchy. This helped IR separate 
itself from other political theory; the extraordinary, the state of exception without rules became the 
field of IR and the state of normalcy based upon the ultimate authority of the sovereign that of political 
theories. The fixed borders of the state also separated societies from each other and from the state. 
The state became to be seen at the same time as the fixed territorial container of society and as existing 
above it, as the ultimate authority governing it.  
As the Weberian concept of the state and the international law definition of sovereignty became the 
dominant and later static definitions of the state, the boundary between the inside and the outside of 
the state started looking natural and fixed. This has resulted in a situation where their relationship, 
and the constitutions of their separation is not analysed, and the fixation of the territoriality of the 
state has led to thinking in terms of either/or; either the territorial state is relevant throughout history 
or it is disappearing as society is no longer contained within it. (Agnew 1994, 53–54.) This has serious 
repercussions for the (spatial) imagination of the discipline. As will be demonstrated in the following 
section, the two traditional mainstream approaches of International Relations, neorealism and 
institutionalism, take the state as an unproblematic actor that exists prior to interaction with other 
                                                            
5Sovereignty served to separate the domestic from the international. Domestic politics were left to the political theorists. 
International politics, became the unit of analysis for International Relations.  
6Like will be discussed later in this chapter, the state-centrism, ahistoricism and territoriality assumptions of this 
imagination have been criticized, but alternatives have either fallen to the same trap, remained agnostic about the 
relevance of physical world, or have not suggested alternatives at all.  
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states. Additionally, the principle of sovereignty is taken as an ahistorical constant. Thus the sovereign 
state is central because it is the (territorially fixed) locus of legitimate authority.  
  
2.1. The rejection of time and space of the mainstream 
Classical realism takes the human nature as the ultimate explaining factor of war; insecurity and 
conflict are an inherent part of the human condition. Politics is about trying to contain that nature and 
maintain peace although there is no final solution to it; conflict is inevitable. To Hans Morgenthau, 
for example, power is sought not only to gain a relative advantage but also to create “a secure political 
space”, such as a territory. In the modern world, from the classical realist view, the sovereign state is 
one such secure political space. (Jackson & Sørensen 2013, 73–74.) In modernist Europe, when the 
locus of sovereignty gradually moved from the monarch to the state, Enlightenment and revolutions 
in Europe corroded the basis for hierarchical dynasties of the monarchs. The multiplicity of religions 
ate away their authorisation. The bordered and sovereign nature of the nation-state enabled new 
imagined communities, nations, to pursue freedom and all things good within them, regardless of 
those outside of the community. (Anderson 2007, 40–41.). The territorial state became the only 
possible place for the pursuit of all things good and virtuous whereas the outside was a place of war 
and violence. The state became the only possible place and guarantee of security. Inside the state 
there is politics and outside realpolitik, politics based upon merely security and material interests. 
(Agnew 1994, 60-62.) 
What is important here is that the centrality of the state in classical realism is not inevitable, only 
power and self-interest are (Forde 1995, 144). Other international systems than the state system are 
imaginable but the system of sovereign states is the one that has organised international life in the 
last centuries. Sovereignty is what separates political order within from the anarchy and inevitable 
conflict outside. To Morgenthau, sovereignty (as defined in international law) is a doctrine that has 
legitimized the modern state system since the late 16th century; a good enough constant but not 
something perpetual or permanently fixed. (Morgenthau 1967; cited in Biersteker & Weber 1996, 4.) 
Also E.H. Carr takes it as a “convenient label” to refer to the independent authority states claimed to 
have in modern times, but not a constant (Carr 1964; cited in Biersteker & Weber 1996, 5). Neither 
does he take the modern territorial state as the only possible form of organisation of life, but as a 
convenient political fiction that people believe in and accept. Therefore, as long as states are believed 
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to exist as actors on the international agenda, theory can also take them as such. (Carr 2001, 137; 139; 
143–153; cited in Luoma-aho 2009, 300.)   
In classical realism, the sociospatial imagination about the possible forms of organisation of life is 
not fixed. However, in structural neorealism, institutionalised by Kenneth Waltz, unlike in classical 
realist accounts, the imagined and not-fixed nature of sovereignty is no longer recognised (or at least 
not analysed), and the state is taken as the only actor in international relations. This is because 
structural explanation is prioritised over historical validity; the system of states has “an existence 
outside the historical contexts in which it [has] evolved”. (Agnew 1994, 56–58.) World history is 
perceived to be a timeless “tragedy of endless repetition” where the anarchic structure cannot be 
escaped (Patomäki 2011, 340). The explaining factor of anarchy is the structure of the international 
system, not human nature like in classical realism. The focus of the analysis is in the structure of the 
system and the state is assumed really to exist as an actor outside and prior to interaction. (Jackson & 
Sørensen 2013, 79.) Sovereignty organises the structure; within their territories, states decide on their 
own how to deal with problems and the international structure is anarchical because there is no global 
authority to organise it.  (Biersteker & Weber 1996, 5–6). The ultimate goal of the state is to survive 
and for that, it tries to gain as much relative advantage as possible. 
As state sovereignty is based upon the previous model where sovereignty was endowed in the physical 
person of the monarch, the state is often thought as a biological entity. This naturalises the state as a 
given, and as a naturalised individual. (Agnew 2005, 439–440.) The state is pre-supposed and defined 
prior to any analysis and supposed to have an existence outside of interaction. With this static and 
substantial view of the state, it is hard to deal for example with private actors performing governance 
functions because they operate in a state-field, but are not public state-actors. (Hibou 2004, 20). This 
favours the thinking of entities and the relations between them, which IR tends to put first, or inside 
them or the system of entities as a whole. This thinking discourages the studying of relations that 
have no primary level and/or which cut through the entities. (Neumann 2004, 265–266.) Therefore, 
if there are forces that would cut through the body of state, such as transnational corporations, it is 
seen as a sign that the state is under threat. What is state-related is presupposed to the analysis, and 
therefore things considered non-state are left out before the analysis is even started.  
Liberal institutionalism has been depicted as a challenger to neorealism because it raised other actors 
and interests than the state to the international agenda. For example Robert O. Keohane and Joseph 
Nye (1977) argued that military concerns were not the only nominator of state behaviour but that with 
the rise of economic, social and ecological interdependence states had to take into account other 
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factors as well. However, their attempt was not to replace realist theory with a liberal interdependence 
one but to bridge the two together. They took complex interdependency7 as one ideal extreme and the 
realist ideal of the world system as another. Most of the time, real world situation would fall 
somewhere between them. (Keohane & Nye 1987, 726–729; 731.)  
In similar thought, Richard N. Cooper (1972) argued that as world trade grew, structural 
interdependence grew because both counterparts of trade relations were more and more sensitive to 
changes in them, not just the other (weaker) dependent one. Therefore there was a growing need for 
countries to make joint economic decisions and policies, and thus institutional interdependence grew 
as well. (Cooper 1972, 159–163.) However, it did not challenge the primacy of the territorial state, 
only that its interests were more multi-faceted (most of the time) than what realists would have us 
believe, and that multinational corporations and international organizations were relevant to 
international analysis as situations of complex interdependence occurred in the world. (Biersteker & 
Weber 1996, 6–7.)  However, the sovereign territorial state remained the central actor (Agnew 1994, 
58); the idea of billiard balls was maybe fine-tuned to take utilitarianism into account, but the ideal 
of the state was left caricatured as a material subject. (Walker 1995, 31.)  
These theories do not care to explain what might exist in international relations. Therefore, they are 
inadequate to explain transformation as the study of transformation is essentially about contemplating 
on what forces/structures/preferences could be. Rather, their purpose is to “describe how “motion” 
occurs – given a set of structures or preferences” in international relations. (Ruggie 1993, 169–171.) 
A system of territorial states is “unhistorically accepted, conceptually assumed and philosophically 
unexamined”, as the territorial state is taken as a fact of nature and its actions in the world are then 
studied (Elden 2005, 10). This does not make them necessarily bad theories, they are just only able 
to answer, or even imagine, questions of a certain kind. For example neorealism is good at 
understanding logics of relations of force, but to be a grand theory, it has to discount or ignore “the 
integrity of those domains of social life that its premises do not encompass”.  (Ruggie 1993, 169–
171.) Their conceptualisations of the state or sovereignty are not inherently bad, but they are 
potentially dangerous because they are important, and they are what our discipline is organised around. 
Therefore, it is important to reflect on what the assumptions they make about the state and the society 
and if they are leading us astray. (Schouten 2009, 5.) When their premises come problematic is when 
                                                            
7 Complex interdependence refers to a situation where the state does not monopolise contacts between societies and states 
do not use force against each other (Keohane & Nye 1977, 24–25). 
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they dominate the field and exclude alternative theoretical imaginaries; when they trap the rest of the 
discipline to the territorial trap with them. 
The ideal of a territorially fixed sovereign state has trapped our discipline in John Agnew’s (1994) 
famous territorial trap8. The trap is set, when a scholar takes state territory as a fixed unit of sovereign 
space, and obscures the interaction of processes of different scales (like local, national or international) 
with polar conceptualisations like domestic/foreign and national/international and/or views the 
society as a national phenomenon, contained within the territorial state. (Agnew 1994, 53–54; 59–
60.) The assumption of sovereignty being contained within the territorial borders can be witnessed in 
political life as well. Solutions to most problems are sought through intergovernmental channels. 
Taking the state as a territorial given has also made policy makers focus on the heads of states and 
their actions and leaving many other actors unnoticed. Also environmental and cultural phenomena 
not responding to state boundaries are still understood through national citizenship or boundaries. 
The way data is collected is also state-based and makes thinking of geography in a non-state-way 
difficult. (Murphy 1996, 102–103; 105.) 
 
2.2. Globalisation as a move away from territoriality: Still no reflection on 
time/space 
The assumptions of the mainstream have of course not been left uncriticised. Especially the end of 
the cold war inspired many scholars to question the connection between legal (de jure) sovereignty 
and international anarchy. In many accounts, the traditional view of sovereignty as the ultimate 
authority over a territory and society within it is no longer accepted as sufficient depiction of the 
world. (Agnew 2005, 437.) Numerous scholars (see e.g. Murphy 1996; Teschke 2002; 2003; Osiander 
2001; Branch 2012) have made their contribution to establish that the dominant understanding of 
Westphalia is a myth with little or no factual basis; the (European) states of the 17th century bore little 
resemblance to modern states (Murphy 1996, 83). It is widely accepted that the system of states has 
not always been comprised of territorial nation-states but rather has varied historically (Jarvis & 
                                                            
8Although Agnew had a crucial point in his formulation of the trap, there are some aspects of it I will not adhere to. Like 
most globalisation theorists, that are discussed later, he also takes the territorial nation-state encapsulating the society as 
a valid thing of the past. His territorial trap formed into one when the world changed but IR theory did not; he accepts the 
territorial state as a valid thing of the past. (Lacher 2006, 120.) 
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Paolini 1995, 6–7) from absolutist, liberal, and totalitarian to the modern (or post-modern) state of 
our time (Biersteker 2013, 247; 251).  
These chronological mappings are based on an understanding of world history as a story of inevitable 
progress, for example from developing to the magnificent Western model of democracy and perpetual 
peace. (Patomäki 2011, 340.) Space is transferred to time; differences in space (e.g. centre–periphery) 
are actually taken to mark difference in time. The transformation of the periphery to resemble the 
modern centre is only a matter of time as there is only one temporality and no space where all states 
follow the same trajectory of development from barbarian to modern, enlightened states. (Massey 
2005, 147–148). The problems inherit in this kind of single-temporality thinking is evident when one 
is reminded, for example, that the formal demise of the medieval-form Holy Roman Empire happened 
in 1806; closer to the birth of the European Community (1958) than the assumed birth moment of the 
modern state in Westphalia (1648) (Ruggie 1993, 167). 
Globalisation scholars (e.g. Behr 2008; Beeson 2003; Strange 1996) argue that the shrinking scope 
of issue-areas that nation-states are able to govern effectively indicates that the concept of (state) 
sovereignty is no longer capable to describe the world. (Beeson 2003, 357.) This view is based on 
absolutism; the state either is or is not sovereign. If the state cannot contain the society or political 
and economic life within its territorial borders, it is no longer sovereign. Others (see e.g. Shaw 1994; 
Linklater & Macmillan 1995; Scholte 2000) concentrate on the arguments that also society is “spilling 
out” of state territories. These world/global society approaches to globalisation portray it as not only 
something that connects distinct parts of the world together, but that also creates a single global 
culture or society. For example Jan Aart Scholte (2000) argues that “‘global’ relations are social 
connections in which territorial location, territorial distance and territorial borders do not have a 
determining influence. In global space, ‘place’ is not territorially fixed, territorial distance is covered 
in effectively no time, and territorial frontiers present no particular impediment”. (Scholte 2000, 179; 
cited in Amin 2002, 386.)  
Scholars argue that now in our post-modern times civil society has shifted from national to global, 
reproduce “sovereignty [...] as the hallmark of society” (Lacher 2003, 529). The notion of state-centric 
Westphalian modernity is not questioned per se but instead accepted as a valid thing of the past. Old 
theories are accepted as having been valid because social and political authority really were 
territorially organized and the past really was defined by the state. , as a result, globalists exaggerate 
the territorial features of the past. (Brenner 1999, 59.) The artifice and incompleteness of the modern 
state based on sovereignty are not recognised (Walker 2000, 225) but instead accepted as valid things 
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of the past whereas post-modernity is marked by ‘globality’ instead of sovereignty. The socio-spatial 
imagination remains one-sided, seeing social relations and the territorial organization of social life as 
either national territoriality or global non-territoriality, nothing else is deemed possible. (Lacher 2003, 
529.) Space is continued to be seen as ahistorical and temporally fixed; the only difference between 
global and national social spaces is that of geographical size. From this view, geographical space 
seems to be filled with social practices, not as produced or reconfigured by them (Brenner 1999, 54–
55; 59.) Thus, the global space is the container of society instead of the state, but the problem of fixed 
territoriality remains. Globalist theorists have failed to analyse the dialectical process of construction 
and renegotiation of space. 
According to deterritorialisation theorists, the world is becoming borderless as flows of ideas, people, 
and products make state borders increasingly porous. In their view, time loses its meaning as 
communication technology and ways of travel become faster and more efficient; world is all space 
and no time. In their view, the spaces of fixed and enclosed territorialisation, the territorial states, are 
undermined and replaced by “new geographies of networks and flows”, like electronic media and 
internationalising capital, that are spatial but not territorial. The world is being re-organised 
sociospatially. The old sociospatial form of organisation of social and political life, territoriality, is 
taken to be dichotomous with the new global form of sociospatial organisation; the more the world is 
organised in networks and flows, the less there is of territorial organisation. And therefore, the less 
there is state. (Brenner 1999, 60–62.) This takes spatiality in absolutes; more of one means less of the 
other. Additionally, it takes the transformation as inevitable course of history; like absolutist states 
transformed into territorial ones, so will territorial states give way a global political authority.  
 
2.3. Legal/empirical sovereignty, but still territorial 
As a response the globalisation critique and in defence of the concept of sovereignty, some scholars 
have disaggregated the concept of sovereignty. According to Janice E. Thomson (1995), sovereignty 
is best understood as the exclusive authority to make decisions, not as state control, because the issues 
and regions under state control are in the state of flux whereas the states’ claim to ultimate authority 
has remained constant over three centuries. She however suggests that empirically authority and 
control are hard to separate and the understanding of their relationship is a central problem for IR. 
(Thomson 1995, 214; 223.)  James A. Caporaso (2000) separated the four pillars of the Westphalian 
order: authority, territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. Authority refers to the recognised 
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exclusive right to make rules, territoriality links that political authority with physically bounded space 
that sets limits to it. Sovereignty combines authority with the exclusion of other authorities. 
Citizenship as well is defined by the territorial boundaries. (Caporaso 2000, 7–11; 14.)  
Perhaps the most known version of disaggregating the concept of sovereignty has been made by 
Stephen D. Krasner (1999). He categorises the aspects of the term sovereignty in four groups: 1) 
international legal sovereignty, 2) Westphalian sovereignty, 3) domestic sovereignty and 4) 
interdependence sovereignty. International legal sovereignty refers to (legal) practices of mutual 
recognition between entities that are often territorial and have formal juridical independence. Political 
organization that excludes, be it de facto or de jure, external actors from the given territory constitutes 
Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty is achieved when these formally organized political 
authorities can exercise effective control within the polity’s territory, framed by territorial boundaries. 
Interdependence sovereignty refers to the control of flows of goods, people, information and capital 
across borders. Different forms of sovereignty are created with different combinations authority, 
control and legitimacy. (Krasner 1999, 3–4.) 
These types of sovereignty can co-exist, or a state can have only one or two types of sovereignty but 
not the others. Taiwan is an example of a state with no international legal sovereignty but that has 
Westphalian sovereignty, and Somalia of a one with international legal sovereignty but practically no 
domestic or interdependence sovereignty. When theorists argue that states are losing sovereignty as 
they are losing control of the movements across their borders, they are focusing on the ability of a 
state to exercise control, not its authority. The scope of activities that state control effectively is 
declining as international phenomena are becoming more transnational in nature, such as terrorism, 
environmental degradation, drug trafficking and so on. If a state is not able to control the flow of 
ideas, people or capital across its borders, it is losing interdependence sovereignty and most likely 
also the ability to control them domestically, which results in the loss of domestic control, but not 
necessarily to the loss domestic authority or sovereignty and much less to the erosion of international 
legal or Westphalian sovereignty. (Krasner 1999, 4; 12–13.) 
These redefinitions make it possible to argue (against deterritorialisation and/or global society 
approaches) that it is just a certain aspect of sovereignty that is possibly eroding, rather than the entire 
concept of sovereignty. However, these accounts remain in the territorial trap as well. They are all 
based upon the organisation of social and political life in territorial terms. In all of them, political 
authority stops at the territorial borders of the state. Controlling phenomena crossing borders is 
considered is just that; control. Political authority does not cross borders.  These scholars continue to 
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separate the domestic and the international; domestic is not as relevant because the international 
structure is taken as the primary site of international relations. Additionally, also society is still 
assumed to reside within the territorial state. 
All these accounts concentrate on the discrepancy between the states’ international legal sovereignty 
and their limited empirical sovereignty. Jackson is interested in how quasi-states, states that are 
incapable of supporting themselves on their own, are treated in the international system, what are the 
constitutive rules, rules that define the game, of the sovereignty game. The existence of weaker states 
without them being taken over or divided up by other, stronger states, to Jackson, indicates the 
changing rules of the game. (Jackson 1990, 34–37.) However, his model does not explore how states 
are constituted as states, as sovereigns. He takes states as prior to sovereignty, prior to interactions, 
and state territoriality as a given even if some governments are not able to effectively govern those 
territories. Whereas I agree with Jackson that sovereignty is renegotiated and changes in time, but 
this does not mean that a state would exist on its own, or would achieve statehood, outside of the 
struggles over control and sets of relationships that come to define what it means to be a state. Being 
a state comes into being through contestation and maintenance; states do not exist as abstract 
individuals. (Agnew 2005, 440.) 
Thomas Risse’s (2011) formulation of areas of limited statehood, where statehood is understood in 
Weberian terms, describe the limited ability of a state to enforce rules and control the means of 
violence in a territorial, sectoral, social and/or temporal dimension. Territorial in Risse’s formulation 
refers to parts of the state’s territory9, sectoral to specific policy areas, social to specific parts of the 
state’s population, and temporal to certain time periods. It is important to notice that the opposite of 
limited statehood is not unlimited statehood but rather consolidated statehood. Consolidated 
statehood refers to the areas where and the degrees to which the state is able to enforce decisions and 
control the means of violence. As such, statehood is not dichotomous. However, an area of limited 
statehood does not mean an area that is lacking in governance or that is anarchical.  (Risse 2011, 1–
5; 9.) Risse’s conceptualization has merits in that it does not assume the state government to be able 
to govern effectively everything, everywhere, and all the time. The establishment of state’s political 
authority is not just about controlling a territory in the eyes of other states, nor is it fixed but rather 
contested and changing, and even at its best, consolidated with other forms of authority. The problem 
                                                            
9 Risse’s understanding of territory takes space as cartographic space; territorial space refers to a certain area on a map, 
like a country or a part of a desert.  
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with Risse’s formulation is that it takes the ideal Westphalian state to actually exist in the Western 
world, at least most of the time10. (Risse 2011, 28.) 
 
2.4. Social constructivism: Agnosticism towards physical space 
Many conservative constructivist IR theorists have taken sovereignty as a definitive factor in the 
state’s social identity. To be a legitimate state, the state needs to fulfil intersubjective ideas of 
legitimate statehood and what is considered to be appropriate state action. To maintain its sovereign 
state identity, the state needs to keep up basic institutional practices that change over time. (Reus-
Smit 1999, 5.) Sovereignty is the organising principle of international society but it is not constant 
and nor is it guaranteed as other states may not deem a state’s claim to final authority legitimate from 
here to eternity, always constituting anarchy between separate state units, but in constant change and 
with possibility of chancing; the anarchic system can change. (Biersteker 2013, 260–261.) For 
example Alexander Wendt (1994) accepts the Westphalian state system as a valid description of the 
world (past) but does not take it as a given constant; the system can change for example into a society, 
from anarchy to authority. This can happen if states start identifying themselves more collectively 
and political authority starts to internationalise11. (Wendt 1994, 393.) 
Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (1996) suggest that state sovereignty is a social construct. 
They define sovereignty as external recognition given to a state to exercise authority over its affairs. 
Their analysis focuses on how that recognition is gained and given though practices and constantly 
renegotiated and reformulated in interactions between state and non-state actors. To them, state and 
sovereignty constitute each other (Biersteker & Weber 1996, 11–12.) Biersteker (2013) suggests that 
the statist territorial form of sovereignty defined in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and the 
founding principles of the United Nations is changing to a contingent definition of sovereignty. 
Whereas the statist sovereignty is based upon the inviolability of borders and the principle of non-
intervention, the contingent form promotes the R2P (responsibility to protect) principle and 
democratic domestic regimes as a prerequisite for international recognition. (Biersteker 2013, 255.) 
                                                            
10 States of exception, such as the hurricane Katrina, can temporarily create areas of limited statehood even in the Western 
world (Risse 2011, 5). 
11 From this gradual change, sovereignty, constituting the current anarchy of mutual recognition, is relocated, to varying 
degrees, to transnational authorities. In this state system, sovereignty is not a stable feature of state agency but one possible 
social identity; transferring sovereignty to a collective does not erode the state, only reorganises state power. This new 
form of state would break down “the spatial coincidence between state-as-actor and state-as-structure”. (Wendt 1994, 
393.) 
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However, also for him, the territorial form of sovereignty is a valid thing of the 20th century. In a 
similar thought, Alexander B. Murphy (1996) takes sovereignty as an ideal that is both a shaper of 
circumstance as well as an outcome of it. It is historically relevant because it has shaped the way 
people understand authority and territory, but its meaning is not a static constant. He distinguishes 
sovereignty in the sense of what states are allowed to do internationally and what their obligations 
are, and sovereignty as the relationship between territory and power. According to him, understanding 
the content of the first aspect has fluctuated over time between systemic and anarchic views, but the 
latter has steadily moved towards a more accepted sovereign territorial ideal. This ideal has become 
the only imaginable spatial framework for social life. (Murphy 1996, 87–89; 91.)  
Constructivists have made the crucial point that the idea of sovereignty is not naturally given12 but 
rather socially constructed in their interaction and practices (Agnew 2005, 440). They also help us 
understand different identities and objectives different states have as well as their rules for dealing 
with each other (what sovereignty is). However, the state is taken to exist a priori to social interaction, 
only its identity changes over time. Space stays a constant. Only being interested in the social reality 
has its downside; constructivist approaches tend to lose sight of the material world and overemphasise 
the social in their takes on territory and territorial borders. Some forget that “social constructions are 
always constructions of something: hence they are not entirely arbitrary and people are not able to 
design the world deliberately according to their wishes”. (Forsberg 2003, 8–9.)  
At their best, constructivist approaches no longer treat territory as objective, but acknowledge the 
social construction of its social meaning. However, constructivist scholars are mainly interested in 
the social reality and do not really engage in ontological discussion about the ‘real’ world because 
according to constructivist epistemology, we can only know about the social world, social 
interpretations of the material world. The social world, the shared system of meanings, symbols and 
practices, is what interests a constructivist scholar and most of them are either agnostic or not really 
interested about “the language-independent real world out there”. (Guzzini 2000, 159–160.) 
Constructivists can analyse how the physical is constructed in the social world but not how the 
physical constructs the social; how the physical and the social worlds are in a constant process of co-
construction.  
The “picture of politics organised into sovereign states” holds the discipline’s ontology and us captive. 
There are defenders and there are critics, but even the critics always use that picture as a starting point. 
                                                            
12 This is however not necessarily a new observation; Walker (2000) argues that the ‘naturalness’ of sovereignty was an 
artificial construct was well known already by philosophers of the state like Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Walker 
2000, 225). 
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(Havercroft 2011, 1–2.) If these trapped theories would be applied to the cases of the Sino-Burmese 
borderlands I will introduce in my analysis, they would miss important aspects of it. Theories 
concerned with only time and not space might take the introduction of neoliberal property rights in 
Myanmar as examples of how the Burmese state moves towards its capitalist modern future. They 
would miss the complex relationships and the existing forms of rule, authority, and property rights, 
and sociospatial imaginations that already exist, and how they interact with other forms of sociospatial 
processes. Constructivist analysis on the other hand could analyse how discourses about property 
change, but would miss the importance of the spatial. 
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3. SPATIAL TURN IN IR? THE STATE AS AN EFFECT OF PROCESSES 
Due to the uneasiness of IR to really conceptualise time and space, which is shared with the social 
sciences at large; most theories have difficulties with dealing with time and especially space (Massey 
1992, 67). Space and time appear to us as self-evident as they are basic categories of our existence 
(Harvey 1989, 201; cited in Ruggie 1993, 147). The problem for theory is that is these essential 
concepts are taken as self-evident, and as common sense, many underlying assumptions that go 
unnoticed when they are not conceptualised (Massey 2005, 147–148). Our perception of time and 
space have developed in a certain context of practices, discourses and habits. New time–spaces are 
difficult to theorise, or even understand as the ‘old’ perceptions of time and space dominate our 
thinking. (Harvey 1989, 201; cited in Ruggie 1993, 147.) Current thinking in social sciences is 
dominated by the European modernist vision of capitalist nation-states and to a lesser agree, Marxism, 
that both have been built on an universalist vision of a grand narrative of history moving in a linear 
fashion towards one end, although they predict different outcomes. (Dirlik 2002, 17.) 
This can be witnessed for example in the historical mappings of the development of the state have 
not translated to (m)any theoretical formulations about the state and its changing form. When the idea 
sparks some scholarly debate, the entries simply criticise the statist tendency, but do not do anything 
about it, or show that the state has a history but do not adjust their concepts to accommodate the 
state’s changing nature. The changing nature of the state is not easy to articulate when the vocabulary 
is based upon a discourse of its statist form. (Walker 1995, 34.) Additionally, whatever historical 
mappings have been made, they have mainly focused on the development of the Western states. 
Scholars have tended to either assume that all states will follow the Western path of development or 
that developmental states such as China are something completely different (although these states 
exist prior to interaction) from the Western ones. I find neither assumption satisfying. 
To really escape statist state-centric thinking, we need not only to rethink our basic assumptions and 
forget the stories we tell about the state, but also reformulate them in a way that allows for 
heterogeneous forms of sociospatial organisation and overlapping authorities in time and space but 
also is theoretically applicable. If political authority is not thought of as exclusively based on the 
modern state, political authorities, including the state, can be seen as multiple mixtures of modern, 
pre-modern and non-modern elements. Pre-modern or non-modern has not been replaced by the 
modern, not even in Europe, but instead various discourses and alternatives co-exist, contest and 
mutually construct each other. (Dirlik 2002, 24.) As a global condition, modernity, including 
sovereignty, “affects all our actions, interpretations, and habits, across nations and irrespective of 
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which civilizational roots we may have or lay claim to. In this sense, it is a common condition on a 
global scale that we live in and with, engage in dialogue about, and that we have to reach out to grasp”. 
(Wittrock 2000, 58–59.)  
To understand how modern statehood is made to work in space and time, in this chapter I will 
conceptualise space in relation to time, and the state in a way that is sensitive to both space and time, 
contexts and historical change. I do not assume the territorial state to be the only system of authority 
and social organisation, but rather one amongst many not only in time, but also in space. The purpose 
of this chapter is to find a way in which to analyse how the state appears in as a social and material 
reality. This approach is sensitive to the fact that even in the heyday of the territorial state, alternative 
forms of sociospatial organisation have existed; the fact that “we have nation-states now doesn’t mean 
that there aren’t other ways of organizing those things, or that other ways of organizing life are no 
longer important or no longer present”. (Schouten 2009, 4.)  
To open my imagination to new sociospatial imaginaries, I have turned to geography, especially its 
sub-disciplines of political geography and critical geopolitics, to find a reflexive understanding of 
space that takes into account the co-constitutions of the physical and the social. Additionally I have 
taken some influences from critical IR scholars and sociologists. The most important lesson I have 
taken from anthropology is taking the world in its complexity and heterogeneity; it opens up the 
question of “what one studies when one studies politics”, or the state, instead of taking it as a given. 
(Schouten 2009, 4.) I define the state as an effect of structural practices, the state is constantly 
changing and restructuring in time and space, realized in the everyday practices that take place in 
multiple locations simultaneously, instead of being a historically and geographically fixed, 
unchanging entity. This allows for a more flexible and historically sensitive reading on the state.  
It will allow us to apply the same conceptualisation to all states without assuming they will all follow 
the same path and thus enables us to talk about state and globalisation outside of the Western world. 
It allows for a consideration of histories but takes into account the current other processes and 
discourses that shape the state process. This does not imply that all states would be inherently different 
as they do share practices and discourses and the same processes, such as neoliberalism and 
globalisation, affect them all, to varying degrees. Additionally, the possible sources of political 
authority are not limited to state actors but instead churches, NGOs and multinational companies 
(MNCs) can become sources of political authority, also without challenging state authority, through 
social practices (Brown 2012, 64–65). This should not be seen as an exercise of relativisation, of 
‘anything goes’, looking at how state sovereignty works and how it is taken for granted is not a move 
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away from constant foundation of political life but rather a reminder that its making and upholding 
has been acts of artifice all along. (Walker 2000, 226.) It is not irrelevant how we see states, where 
we think global politics happen or who we see as a relevant actor. Academic thinking effects political 
thinking and can thus have an influence on how politics work. (Sjoberg 2008, 481.) 
 
3.1. Space as co-existence of trajectories 
The spatial turn in social sciences initiated in the 1980s by authors such as Henri Lefebvre and David 
Harvey who argued that space was left unanalysed. They argued that space has an operational and 
instrumental role in the making of the world and the social. (Patomäki 2011, 339–340.) Agnew’s 
territorial trap reflects the same concern. The social construction of space had been analysed already 
in the 1970 in the field of geography, but it left geographers merely analysing the end product of 
social life that other disciplines study. After the spatial turn, the construction was not taken as one-
sided anymore; not only was the spatial constructed by the social but also the social was spatially 
constructed as well. Society is organised spatially and that spatiality makes a difference to social life. 
(Massey 1992, 70.) I see the spatial turn as necessary for also IR and for this end, suggest a way to 
conceptualise time and space in a more reflexive manner than what has been thus far. This is essential 
because all social processes have a geographical extent and a historical duration; all action is 
embedded in the world (Crang & Thrift 2000, 3). 
As biological beings, human beings inhabit physical space, attached to the surface of the planet by 
gravity. In this thesis, I will assume that there exists a natural space independent of human action, but 
by no means do various phenomenon and living things even then are static but in constant process of 
becoming. I understand space as non-Euclidean13, as folded and relational “with reference to the 
connection of actors in any one place to dynamics across space”. In this understanding of space, 
Euclidean issues, such as spatial proximity, are recognised but not the only issue in the analysis of 
space. (Ettlinger 2011, 538; 542.) Space is open, the coincidence of trajectories of in-time-changing 
processes but different sociospatial strategies struggles over its meaning and can make it seem as 
fixed and that fixity as natural.  However, once humans come into contact with that space, as social 
beings, they attach meanings to it. This is what social constructivists have already argued for. 
However, physical space cannot be taken as a neutral product of social action. It plays a role in 
                                                            
13 Euclidean understanding of space meaning that a straight line connects any two points (Ettlinger 2011, 538). 
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people’s lives and co-constitutes social space. Physical space restricts and enables social action. One 
cannot climb a mountain simply by thinking and acting like it is flat.   
The defining feature of physical space is the mutual externality of parts. First, in absolute terms, the 
parts of physical space can only be situated in one location at one given time and no other being can 
be in the exactly same location at the same time. In more comprehensible terms, a person as a physical 
being can be at one place at a time. This is the location (or locus) of the person, for example on the 
ground or sitting in a chair. Second, an agent or a thing can occupy a physical place that is defined 
by its range, surface and volume. A physical place can be for example a house that has different 
properties, such as walls. Third, agents and things can have (a) position(s) in relational terms; 
something is positioned in relation to something else, for example sitting next to someone else. 
(Bourdieu 1996, 11–12.) 
Through social interaction, discourses and practices, the locations, places and positions in physical 
space are collectively constructed socially meaningful in appropriated social space (space that has 
identities attached to it) (Bourdieu 1996, 12); space is represented as having social effects. This gives 
social categorisations, identities and relations spatiality. (Agnew 1994, 55.) For example, the physical 
position of two people sitting in chairs that are in line in itself does not have any other meaning. But, 
as the position is constructed in appropriated social space, it can become socially meaningful. For 
example, the two people might be heads of states and the person sitting behind the other is given 
lower social status based upon the sitting arrangement. Therefore, “the locus and the place occupied 
by an agent in appropriated social space are excellent indicators of his or her position in social space” 
(Bourdieu 1996, 12). However, this is not always the case; the diplomat sitting behind the other might 
also be seated that way by mistake or for some other reason other than indicating her social position. 
Social space is a “structure of juxtaposition of social positions” constituted by “the mutual exclusion 
(or distinction) of positions” that constitute it. For example living in the city gives the agent a position 
in relation to those in the countryside and also to the others living in the city. The physical place the 
agent occupies as a physical being is translated and given meaning in the social space. The location 
of a social agent (such as a person) or a thing constituted as a property in social space is “characterized 
by its position relative to other locations” and their distance from each other. The permanent(ish) 
place an agent occupies, the relative positioning of her localizations to other agents’ localizations and 
the places she legally occupies characterise the agent. (Bourdieu 1996, 12.) These spatial social 
positions are relationally constructed and in the constant process of becoming. No identity is constant 
or permanent, not even nationality, even though most political theories would have us think so. 
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“Space does not exist prior to identities/entities”. Instead, “the relations ‘between’ them, and the 
spatiality which is part of them, are all co-constitutive”. (Massey 2005, 10.) 
What is crucial here is that once physical space and social space interact, their co-constitution makes 
them intermeshed. Spatiality refers to this mutual embeddeddness of space and society (Ettlinger 
2009, 219). Therefore, the distinction between physical and social space is a purely theoretical 
exercise. I will use the term space to refer to the complexity that is created thought the co-constitution 
of physical and social space. This space is a product of interrelations, co-constitutive with multiplicity, 
and always under construction. (Massey 2005, 9.) The interrelational aspect of space has often been 
forgotten in IR, how the spatial organisation of human life is an evolving product of action and 
relational performances, not just a neutral context where action happens (Soja 1980, 210; cited in 
Shapiro & Neaubauer 1990, 100); it does not pre-exist its doing (Rose 1999, 248; cited in Amin 2002, 
389). Additionally, physical space is not only a product of social action, but social action is also 
constructed and contested by it. Material changes, such as climate change, pandemics or the depletion 
of a source of energy, alter “the matrix of constraints and opportunities for social actors, giving rise 
to different situations of strategic interaction among them”. (Ruggie 1993, 154.) 
By taking space co-constitutive with multiplicity I mean, following Doreen Massey (2005) that it is 
a part of a complexity of trajectories14. Trajectory is a process of change in a phenomenon that is 
temporal but also inherently spatial in the sense that it is are positioned “in relation to other 
trajectories”. The phenomenon might be anything from a social convention to a geological formation. 
It is important to note that a trajectory is not necessarily a linear one which brings us to the third 
attribute of space, constant process of construction. This means that space is always open, “a 
simultaneity of stories-so-far”. There is no predetermined future; space is always open to new 
connections and juxtapositions. This does not mean however that everything is linked or that all 
interconnections have been made. Space is never ready. (Massey 2005, 9; 11–12.) 
Places are given meaning and value, and activities are separated with boundaries through spatial 
strategies. People residing in space both conform to a spatiality but also “constitute a space-shaping 
practice” with their movements; societies stretch and withdraw in time and space. This spatiotemporal 
distantiation is tied to the structure of domination because “[w]hat happens within a society or a locale 
is shaped in part by the forces operating at the extremes of its extensions”. The greater the 
                                                            
14  There is no universal dominant trajectory that would travel through geographical fixed space and comes across 
ahistorical, static others occupying fixed space like the modern linear time / static space thinking would have us think.  
By accepting multiplicity, we can see other trajectories and stories as well. For example globalisation is not a historical 
inevitability but as one history among others (maybe connected) histories and futures. (Massey 2005, 10–11.) 
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spatiotemporal distantiation, the less visible are the activities of the society. (Shapiro & Neaubauer 
1990, 97; 100.) This is what Michel Foucault calls “governance at a distance”, how citizens are 
conducted by materialised societal norms in everyday practices. The normalisation of norms makes 
governance from distance possible, otherwise constant presence of acts of control would be needed 
to maintain positions of authority. (Foucault 2000, 341; Foucault 2007a, 193; cited in Ettlinger 2011, 
538.) So, the activities of people can be analysed in two ways; “in terms of the presently operating 
forces whose effects they re-inscribe or resist; and in terms of the more remote forces that continue 
to shape their movements”. (Shapiro & Neaubauer 1990, 97; 100.) 
The practices and meanings of social space tend to be retranslated “into physical space in the form of 
a definite distributional arrangement of agents and properties”. The social hierarchies and distances 
are naturalised as fixed from the social onto the physical. As they become naturalised, the social 
seems to “arise out of the nature of things”. As social space is inscribed in physical space, the 
structures of social space are resistant, or at least slow, to change because changes in the social space 
require changes in physical space as well, like deporting persons. (Bourdieu 1996, 12–13.) The 
naturalisation can be ‘natural’, unintended, but also a result of authoritative strategies. Due to the 
resistance of change in physical space, spatial strategies have both intended and unintended effects. 
Therefore, the two spatial strategies (territorialisation and scaling) introduced in the next two sections 
should not be taken as absolute, but rather as porous and constantly contested tendencies towards a 
certain spatial organisation of life. They can even be constituted by practices that are not intended as 
a spatial strategy.  
 
3.2. State space as an effect of structural processes and practices 
In order to be able to understand and analyse processes that seem to cut through the entity of the state, 
we need to stop thinking about the state as if it was a person, a biological entity. Instead, as a form of 
space, the state should be seen as being constantly formed as the old and the new forms of power and 
authority interact, exist in parallel and struggle over domination. (Egnell & Haldén 2013, 3–4.) I take 
the state as an open social system that is co-constituted and determined by relational complexes serves 
as a basis for thinking about the state in a new way. A state cannot be reduced to its insides, its inner 
components, but instead, the past, the outside and interrelations are also an inherent part of what a 
state is (conceived to be). (Patomäki 2003, 361.)  
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Following Timothy Mitchell (1991), I will take the state as a set of structural effects, as a powerful 
(unfinished) product of everyday practices. Primarily, this is an ontological stand on how what is, is. 
I do not take the state as a static entity, but as something that exists in social relations and practices. 
Its forms and functions are (re)produced in social struggle (Glassman 1999, 677–678); what a state 
is is constituted in bundles of social practices that are “every bit as local in their materiality and social 
situatedness as any other” (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, 992). What we call the state “arises from 
techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, 
nonmaterial form” (Mitchell 1999, 77).  This is not to deny the “power of the political arrangements 
that we call the state”. Social benefits, state constitutions, military practice, policing and border 
controls have very real social and material effects on the lives of people. (Mitchell 1991, 81; 94.) I 
call the processes that make the state effect statization, a term already used by some political 
geographers, to express the processual nature of the establishment of state control. In French it is 
called étatisation, “a gradual process through which society becomes increasingly dependent on, or 
dominated by, relations with the state”. However, statization should not be taken to mean the growing 
control of society by a separate sphere called the state, but as “the intensification of the symbolic 
presence of the state across all kinds of social practices and relations”.  (Painter 2006, 755; 758.) 
No state, like no any other form of political authority exists in a vacuum, but is rather negotiated and 
transformed in the context of the existing form(s) of political authority that cross paths with it. The 
world came together for the first time under industrialising capitalism and European empires. The 
spread of modern state sovereignty is the outcome of this comingtogether as students, government 
officials, traders and farmers have come in touch with its principles, powers based on them, and the 
material effects of that power. This has been no inevitable or universal phase of human development 
but a process of spreading of norms and values, albeit a powerful one, amongst others that come 
together in spaces. (Patomäki 2003, 364.) Sovereignty is “a practice that serves to identify the 
character, location, and the legitimacy of political authority, especially the authority to judge what is 
authoritative” (Walker 1995, 26) that has come to dominate how political authority is to be organised 
but it still needs to be made to work in each local encounter. It is about more than just the international 
discourse about what it means to be a state; it has to made to work. Being called a state does not 
ensure that the state actually appears and plays an authoritative role in the social relations it claims to 
have authority over. This it witnessed in countries like Somalia. On the other hand, Taiwanese state 
appears in social and material realities much stronger even though it does not have legal sovereignty.   
Alternative forms of authority co-exist and overlap with others, such as the territorial state, and they 
have to deal with other existing forms political authority. Alternative forms do not necessarily 
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challenge each other, but they need to deal with the social and material realities that have been created 
by the processes that created the effects of political authority. (Davis 2009, 402.) No form has fixed 
meaning or effect; history remains open. As trajectories of political authority, and social and material 
realities intersect and interact, past struggles can be reopened and given new meanings. This creates 
new (im)possibilities; “new combinations of the existing elements of social contexts can be invented 
and innovated; new social forces can emerge; and also genuinely novel elements may be innovated 
and fed into the processes of present and near-future political struggles”. What used to be suppressed 
can become viable and former possibilities become less viable. (Patomäki 2003, 364.) For example 
readings of history can be given new meanings as present social realities change.  
How political and social life is organised is affected by various factors. For example, John Ruggie 
(1993) identifies three dimensions that were crucial in changing the European experience of time and 
space, and how system of rule was organised and imagined, when medieval systems of rules 
transformed towards what is now identified as the modern system of states; material environments, 
strategic behaviour, and social epistemology. Material environments include issues like climatology, 
pandemics, and weapons. The changes in the material world changed the constraints of social action 
and strained the existing arrangements to the point of collapse. Related to the material changes, 
strategic behaviour changed as well. For example, the demographic decline caused by, among others, 
the Black Death, disadvantaged the land-owning class and created opportunities for entrepreneurial 
politicians. Various changes in strategic behaviour and material shocks ultimately came to change the 
system of rule, but not directly to the territorial state that our era has become familiar with. At the 
same time changed what Ruggie calls social epistemology, “the mental equipment that people drew 
upon in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community”. In the linguistic realm, the “I-
form” of speech became dominant, separating I and you, me and the world, and eventually the private 
form the public. In visual arts, where scale had been determined by importance, and subjects had been 
rendered from multiple angles, the single fixed viewpoint became dominant15. Similarly, political 
space came to be defined as it appeared from a single fixed viewpoint, which is institutionalised in 
the concept of sovereignty. (Ruggie 1993, 152–159.)   
Therefore, the norms and practices of the international society are not irrelevant. For example, if 
territorially fixed sovereign states are the norm, there will be reluctance to accept other forms of state 
to the international society, but not impossible; change happens. (Egnell & Haldén 2013, 5.) An 
                                                            
15 Most significantly, “this was precision and perspective from a particular point of view: a single point of view, the point 
of view of a single subjectivity, from which all other subjectivities were differentiated and against which all other 
subjectivities were plotted in diminishing size and depth toward the vanishing point” (Ruggie 1993, 159). 
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example of the co-existence and co-constitution of different trajectories would be capitalism ‘with a 
Chinese flair’ as the Chinese state-controlled economic policy has sometimes been named. The 
existing norms, institutions and tendencies of neoliberal capitalism have crossed paths with pre-
existing trajectories that in effect make the Chinese state appear to exist. The trajectories of capitalism 
alter and become part of those state-effecting processes and practices, and make the Chinese state 
appear different than it was before and more similar to the capitalist states in the West, but not made 
it the same. There is no linear, universal time where the world would progress from feudalism to 
territorial sovereignty to global capitalism or something else but global processes and discourses, and 
encounters of individuals with alternative practices and cultures, alter what a state, or any other form 
of political authority, appears to be. (Patomäki 2003, 363.)  
There are multiple different paths of states as effects that are independent and dependent of each other 
to various degrees. The more the paths come together, the more they might start looking like each 
other but are never the same. (Patomäki 2003, 363.) As an example, when they were not in touch with 
the European powers, the paths of cultures and civilisation outside of old continent had their own 
relations and paths. These paths have come “gradually together over the centuries of expansion of 
capitalism and European imperial states”. However, no matter how strong the influence of European 
ideals and modes of governance have been, this influence has not resulted “in a simple imposition of 
the abstracted and idealized system of mutually exclusive nation-states”. The influence of new ideas 
and practices does not erase the existing spaces, practices or ideas. “To the contrary, what emerged 
was a complex dialectical interplay of resistance and attempts to appropriate and modify the European 
— and later Western — modernity to fit various local circumstances (in some cases with disastrous 
results)”. (Patomäki 2003, 363–364.) Ultimately, then, everything is local even if it is endlessly 
replicated across space (Dirlik 2002, 34). 
The contextually specific modifications and applications of the same phenomena happen as the social 
relations and practices that give the state the effect of existing are maintained and transformed as 
actors interact with other actors. New behaviours emerge as actors come into contact with “new 
legislations, political settings, institutions, economic systems, societies, business actors, and 
individuals across the world”. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405.) By no means are there interactions 
restricted within state territorial borders or within the people who have been naturalised as being the 
society under that state’s control. As political officers go abroad, they meet new colleagues and 
interact with alternative views of the world and the state. After interaction, neither side is necessarily 
the same. For example nationalism was first embraced in colonies through young intellectuals who 
knew a European language and studied in Europe and got familiar with the concepts of nation and 
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nation-state and applied them at home. The travel of both people and knowledge became easier and 
easier through technological advancements, the more was there spread of ideas. (Anderson 2007, 167; 
171.) 
The state understood this view is not just a subjective belief of an individual. The processes and 
practices constituting the organisation of social and political life make the state appear as if it was a 
structure that contains people’s lives and gives them meaning; they constitute statization. Because of 
the way the state is constituted as a power that exists ‘out there’ and that has different material and 
social effects to people’s lives, the state cannot simply be wished away. However, what the state is 
understood to be or how life is thought of to be organised can change, and even in time, the state can 
become less dominate in our sociospatial imagination. What state is practiced to be is not permanent 
or inevitable. (Mitchell 1991, 81; 94.) Therefore, what the state means and in practice is, needs to be 
understood as mutable in time and space. There is no clear starting point, something that was and is 
now becoming something else. Instead, the state is always in a state of transition, always becoming. 
It has never had a static existence and it will never become ‘ready’. (Jarvis & Paolini 1995, 5–6.) 
Neither are the activities conceived of as state-initiated predetermined but produced though action, 
struggle and resistance. The state is “fundamentally enabled by forms of power and struggle 
emanating within the broader society, rather than as representing any permanent congealed power in 
its own right” (Glassman 1999, 677–678);  the state is “but one of a number of expressions or 
mediations of power, rendered in routine, mundane acts and discourses” (Sidaway 2002, 161).   
Statization can occur in practices by both state and non-state actors. Due to the pervasiveness of the 
state in much of social life in our era, practically all actors can be seen to be involved in the “doing 
of the state”. It is not simply the doing of only bureaucrats and state institutions or simply a result of 
routinized administrative practices, but comes into being through the imaginations and 
representations of ordinary people in their everyday lives. Therefore, the question of what or who 
make the state appear to exist as the locus of ultimate political authority is not an ontological but an 
empirical one. In order to understand the complexities statization, we need to consider actors who 
seem to have little to do with the modern state, like merchants, clan leaders and hunters. The frontier 
between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ is fluid, and to begin to understand it, one needs to look “at the way 
in which actors negotiate their relationships to the state, how they at times ‘produce’ statehood 
without realizing it, and how at other times they consciously and willingly contribute to ‘constructing’ 
states”. (Hagmann & Péclard 2010, 542–543; 549–550.)  Similarly, both state and non-state actors 
can be involved in constituting de-statization (Painter 2006, 758). 
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4. SOCIOSPATIAL STRATEGIES FOR MAKING OF THE MODERN 
STATE 
The processes that make the state appear as a structure are multiple and different in different contexts. 
The most fundamental ones of our time, I would argue, are the processes that make the modern 
territorial nation-state appear. They have, after all, been so strong they continue to guide not only the 
academic imagination but also everyday relations all over the world. The Westphalian understanding 
of state sovereignty is based on the complete territorialisation (successfully maintained borders and 
total exclusion of other sources of authority) and hierarchical scaling that makes the state seem to 
nest lover scales and exercise power over them. However, these spatial strategies can never be 
complete, they are rather tendencies. (Agnew 2010, 570). In this chapter I will conceptualise them 
both in order to understand how the territorial state and its power come to exist in social relations.  
If the state is not taken as an entity, neither can (state) power be thought of as located in single entity. 
The power to regulate and control does not initiate from the state somewhere up high, but the state 
itself is a product of processes of regulation and control (Mitchell 1991, 90). When the police use 
force, the tax agency collects taxes or when a state official confiscates land in the name of state 
legislation, their actions constitute what appears as state exercising its power. They constitute the 
very thing that gives the authority for the actions. If power relations should be seen to be produced in 
everyday practices; people are the vehicle of power, not something that power is (merely) exercised 
on. Therefore, the root of power relations is found in the mundane everyday life, not in institutions 
of a high scale in which they can however become crystallised and formalised. (Ettlinger 2011, 547; 
following Foucault 1980a–b; 1990.) The purpose of section 4.1. is to find a way understand how the 
state comes to be seen as a power ‘up-there’, organising life, and giving authority to actors associated 
with the state. I argue that the scaling of power relations creates the effect of a state scale restricting 
and acting on society.  
It is safe to say that the state scale is at least one of the most dominant scales in the contemporary 
world. This is why IR is mesmerised by it, and takes it as a given reality. However, if we understand 
the state as an effect of processes, of which scaling is one, it opens up more avenues of research to 
understand how the state comes into being, and how state power is exercised. What constitutes the 
state effects, however, cannot be assumed ontologically, but should be approached empirically, 
although previous research does offer some hints on where to look. What is important to remember 
is that the sociospatial processes and relations that make the state appear, are not restricted to the state. 
For example, actors or practices that are identified as state-related or political (which is defined by 
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the state), are not necessarily sufficient to understand how state power comes to be exercised in social 
life. This means for the researcher to let go of the separation between public and private spheres, or 
the state from society. As the state effect is produced in social life, the insulation of the society from 
the state, or the political from the private, is only one specific form of how the state appears, is present, 
in social relations. (Poulantzas 1978, 70; cited in Painter 2006, 759.) For this end, state power is 
conceptualised in section 4.2. in a way that allows for the inclusion of actors and processes that seem 
to have nothing to do with the state. 
The state, like other systems of rule, needs to have a spatial extension with which to differentiate 
human collectivities from another because all forms of polity occupy some sort of place; physical as 
well as social. The spatial extension of political authority can be territoriality, but just as well 
networks, mobility or kinship, just to name a few. That extension defines upon what and/or whom 
that political authority can exercise legitimate dominion. (Ruggie 1993, 148–149.) As such, state 
spatiality is essentially “a conditional, contested and ultimately changeable modality” of power; it 
defined where power can be exercised. Therefore, the spatiality of political authority is struggled over 
by actors “entangled in actual power geometries and institutionalised spatial practices”. (MacLeavy 
& Harrison 2010, 1038.) Some sort of spatial power is bound to appear in each social relations. Even 
if territoriality of an authority is unbundled, it will not be located some place else but rather the place 
is becoming something, somehow else spatially organised. (Ruggie 1993, 174.) For the purposes of 
this thesis as an exploration to the making of modern statehood, territorialisation as a spatial strategy 
is conceptualised in section 4.3. 
 
4.1. Scaling makes the state appear as a structure 
Scale means “the level of geographical resolution at which a given phenomenon is thought of, acted 
on or studied”. It creates relations between spaces for a specific social claim, activity or behaviour. 
(Paul 1999, 219.) A simple example would be the United States; the states and the federal state make 
claims for the same territory, and exercise authority over it, but they are thought of as existing on 
different scales; the federal and the state scales. Being ‘located’ on different scales gives them 
different powers based on their relations to each other’s space. Scales are however not given or fixed 
(Wissen 2009, 884), but products, as well as factors, in the construction and dynamics of the 
interactive making of geographical realities (Marston 2000, 220–221). As such, spatial scales are 
never fixed but continuously contested and reconstructed in “their extent, content, relative importance 
and interrelations”. (Swyngedouw 1997, 140–141; cited in MacKinnon 2011, 23.) Thus, scale is both 
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historically and contextually specific, and always in a state of flux. It does not exist outside of the 
community of producers that both constructs and contest it (Jones 1998, 26); rather, they are a way 
of “framing conceptions of reality” (Delaney & Leitner 1997, 94–95; cited in Marston 2000, 221). 
As a rhetoric device, scale is not a neutral ‘truth’ but rather “a representational trope, a way of framing 
political-spatiality that in turn has material effects”. (Jones 1998, 27.) For example, claiming to act 
on a certain scale can give actors power and authority over others and access to resources and 
decision-making. “Actors help produce scales through their activities, and scales, in turn, constrain 
and guide these activities by providing (or taking away) resources” (Lebel et al. 2005). Practices are 
more powerful than discourse in effecting transformation and change. For example nationalism needs 
to be effected by practices of passport check-points, inclusion and exclusion in services and so on. 
Racism is more effectively eradicated by practices that create new social knowledges, like exposing 
segregated population to each other through work and leisure activities, than by awareness raising 
campaigns consisting of speech acts. (Ettlinger 2011, 552.) What is crucial here is that the processes 
and social relations who participate in scalar struggles, are not bounded inside the spatial boundaries 
that are defined in the struggle. For example the boundaries and the relations to other scales of a state 
scale is not constructed and constructed only within what is perceived as the state. For example 
international NGOs participate in the struggles over scale in various locations and contexts even 
though they are not restricted within the perceived boundaries of those scales. 
Scaling is “a relational, power-laden and contested construction that actors strategically16 engage with, 
in order to legitimate or challenge existing power relations” (Leitner et al. 2008, 159). It can be a tool 
for sociospatial strategies that create control and/or empowerment (Wissen 2009, 884) as they fortify 
or relativize the importance of scales and/or create new ones. They are ultimately about the “scalar 
spatiality of power and authority”; where is the spatial boundary of political authority perceived to be 
and how it relates to other spatial authorities. (Leitner et al. 2008, 159.) The definition of scales 
express the geometries of social power; certain definitions strengthen the power and control of some 
while others are disempowered (Swyngedouw 1997, 169; cited in Marston 2000, 238). Although 
scales are subject to transformations through practices and discourses, they can stay relatively fixed 
even for long periods of time as once they are produced, they start to exist independently of actors’ 
perceptions. (Swyngedouw 1997, 169; cited in Marston 2000, 238.) Once established, scalar 
                                                            
16  Strategically here does not mean that the sole, or even conscious, purpose of an actor enmeshed in scaling struggles. 
Rather, strategic means that practices and discourses are engaged in in way that serves a purpose. For example when 
climate change issues are debated over, their main function is not to engage in scaling per se, but as an effect, they can 
fortify, diminish or even create new scales. Scaling is an effect of these strategies, produced in the struggle for power. 
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structures manifest existing power structures. As such, they can influence wider political, economic 
and social processes in carious spatial contexts. (MacKinnon 2011, 32.) 
The making of the state scale as a structure, like any other scale, then, happens in thousands and 
thousands of encounters and practices, but scalar relations and their reconstruction in those encounters 
makes local practices seem vertically organised. A case in point is James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta’s 
(2002) fieldwork on the operations of a government programme in India. Even though field officers 
brought the state to the physically same level as the society, the monitoring and regulating aspect of 
the state made people experience the state as above them. The sense of hierarchy was established for 
example by surprise monitoring visits; the higher officials had continuous access to local worker’s 
space whereas the local workers had a specific time slot when they were allowed to visit the higher 
official’s office. (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, 984–985.) The vertically higher scalar position of the state 
officials gave them more power in relation to the local scale actors. However, scalar practices work 
both ways and should not be merely seen as “the control of groups in place” as people and processes 
not associated with the dominant or ‘higher’ scale can contest and redefine their positions in scales 
as well the scales themselves. (Jonas 2006, 403.) 
The state does not appear the same everywhere, but rather there is “qualitative and quantitative social 
and spatial variation” no matter how standardised the operation of state institutions is (Painter 2006, 
764). Materiality, in addition to the social, helps us understand why particular dimensions of scale 
become fixed or undone; successful scaling depends not only on the discursive powers of actors and 
institutions, but also their ability to manipulate the material dimensions of scale. (MacKinnon 2011, 
28; 30.) For any representation of scale will pass because to be successful, it has to be practically 
effective. “In terms of the expectations it sets up, in terms of activities that it informs and structures, 
it has to be consistent with the way the world, both natural and social, is.” (Cox 1998, 44.) Material 
and social realities, like difficult mountainous terrain and local traditions, can cause contradictions 
and hindrances to state-making, as well contribute to “the production of unintended state effects and 
to state practices that escape the control of the actors who initiated them”. (Painter 2006, 764.) 
Discursive and material realities diverge which creates a “field of possibilities” for challenging norms 
and discourses, like scales. (Ettlinger 2011, 548–549). 
Christian Lund (2011), has named the situation, where there are multiple institutions (also other than 
state institutions) making binding decisions, fragmented sovereignty. According to him, these 
institutions can be in competition with each other, complement each other or form alliances. Together 
they constitute fragmented sovereignty that is not necessarily something on the verge of collapse but 
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something that is making separate things become cohere. (Lund 2011, 887–888.) Aihwa Ong (2004) 
applies her term graduated sovereignty “to describe the rescaling of state power across the national 
landscape and the differential scales of regulatory effect on the rights and privileges of different 
segments of the population”. Defined like this, sovereignty is not seen uniform nor static. Ong takes 
it as “the contingent outcomes of various [state] strategies”. (Ong 2004, 72.)  
 
4.2. Scaled centralised state power 
Although power relations are ultimately resolved at the local level in practices and discourses, for 
example the hoped result or the motivation between an act realising state power in everyday life, can 
be initiated elsewhere than in that particular actor’s head. To understand how political authority is 
realised in power relations, I utilise and further modify Merje Kuus and John Agnew’s (2008) take 
on Michael Mann’s (1984) concepts of despotic and infrastructural power17. Despotic power refers 
to the power of the political authority elite over the rest of the society; basically, what the elite can 
get away with without serious contestation. For example the North Korean elite has high despotic 
power and can practically execute any decision, whereas many other heads of states can only get 
away with a limited range if actions; overturning central norms like private property or individual 
freedom would be considered a revolution. (Mann 2003, 54–55.) 
Power based on coercion alone is not very effective because domination cannot be everywhere all the 
time; it is restricted by the material realities of the world. For example in Southeast Asia, people have 
long been able to escape state control in the periphery, like the Kachin did, and still do, in Burma. On 
the other hand rulers could augment their power by moving people to the centre where their despotic 
power was stronger. (Carsten 1998, 218; 232.) In the centre, the royal courts could control and tax 
the population whereas from the periphery, at best, they could get some tribute or capture some slaves, 
but they were not able to effectively control the highlanders. The people living in the periphery could 
utilise geography to their advantage: for example the Karen people fled to the mountains to avoid the 
royal troops. (Malseed 2009, 367.) To overcome the material restrictions, most ruling elites try get at 
least some form of popular authority from the majority of the population they claim authority over.  
                                                            
17 Although Mann has used them in the study of specifically territorial state power, I believe that with the modifications 
I, and Kuus and Agnew have made, the concepts can be utilised to analyse exercise of power backed by other forms of 
political authority, not only territorial state power. 
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However, popular consent does not need to be based on democracy or nationality, but can also be 
based on efficiency, or being more popular than the other competing sources of political authority. 
For example, if a private company is seen to provide more efficiency and services than for example 
the state, it can have greater authority over some issue-area. (Agnew 2005, 442; 444.) Sometimes, 
legitimacy as perceived by the person that is the object of the exercise of power, is not relevant, but 
what matters is whether other authorities allow the acts and decisions of that power-exercising 
authority. (Tilly 1985, 171.)  For example the US deployed despotic power to destroy the Iraqi 
government, but failed to get the legitimacy to back up the use of coercive power. (Agnew 2005, 442.) 
Alternative local political authorities were able to compete with the US power. At the same time, 
other state authorities on the international stage, while perhaps not seeing the US actions as legitimate, 
did not challenge the use of power, as such accepting it.  
Despotic power is not necessarily territorially fixed18, but can also be based on other spatialities. For 
example in Southeast Asia, the traditional notion of the state was defined by its centre, not its borders. 
The extent of the kingdom was not fixed nor clearly defined but rather in a state of flux; the power of 
the ruler faded from the centre outwards and in the outskirts of the sovereign’s power, it merged with 
that of the neighbouring sovereigns. The power of the ruler was measured by the number of people 
he could control, on the loyalty between persons, not by the geographical extent of his control, clear-
cut mappings of space. (Carsten 1998, 218; 232.)  In today’s world, elites formerly associated with 
the territorial state can shift loyalties to other entities than the territorial state. (Kuus & Agnew 2008, 
102.) This could involve for example “the attenuation of territorial sovereignty in the form of the 
diffusion of authority across multimodal financial network involving transnational corporations, 
banks, other states, debt-rating agencies, and NGOs” (Agnew 2005, 444). Another example of the 
shifting of despotic power from the centralised state form is the transformation of Chinese ministries 
to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have been turned into transnational Fortune 500 companies 
with profit-turning responsibilities for stakeholders of which the Chinese state is the largest. The 
change enhances the state’s embeddeddness in spaces and regimes outside its territory. At the same 
time it disaggregates authority to more, less controllable entities that are more similar to transnational 
companies than state branches. As state power is disaggregated to various actors and institutions, the 
more there is outside pressure to take into account and internalize regimes and regulations. For 
                                                            
18 This is Kuus & Agnew’s own reading of Mann’s concept. For example Daniel Neep (2013) argues that Mann’s 
definition of the state is based on territorial state institutions; to him, state is centralised and its political power stops at 
defined territorial boundaries (Neep 2013, 72; 74). This of course does not render Kuus & Agnew’s reading less relevant 
for this thesis. In fact the modification of Mann’s concepts is absolutely necessary to make the move from the territorial 
view of the state to a spatial one. 
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example Chinese SOEs have had to take into account not only the central government’s policies, but 
also international business regulation to attract foreign investors. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405.) 
Infrastructural power refers to the state’s ability to “actually penetrate civil society, and to implement 
logistically political decisions throughout the realm”. This means for example the state’s ability to 
levy taxes and collect information. (Western) capitalist democracies tend to have more infrastructural 
power than despotic power as they can enforce almost all their decisions relatively fast on all of their 
population and territory. (Mann 2003, 54.) An example of infrastructural power is the 
institutionalisation of state-defined property rights. The more the ownership of land and resources are 
practiced, recognised and defined by state institutions, the more infrastructural power the state in that 
respect has. (Woods 2010, 9.) Mann takes infrastructural power to be limited in the state’s territorial 
borders (ideal infrastructural power would mean total penetration and effective immediate 
enforcement of decisions in the state territory), but based on Kuus and Agnew’s reading it can be 
strongly territorial but alternatively also based on networks (Kuus & Agnew 2008, 102). For example 
currencies and educational provision can create externalities that are not based on nationality nor 
territory. (Agnew 2005, 443.)  
Following Foucault, Aihwa Ong (2004) takes government as technologies of ruling. With this, she 
essentially refers to, I believe, what is called in this thesis infrastructural centralised power. According 
to her, political power is exercised through networks of technologies that link centrally made 
strategies to regulate spaces and populations. These technologies of ruling are invented as calculative, 
ideologically (e.g. neoliberalism) informed responses to specific problems. An example are free trade 
zones that create a state of exception, islands of distinct governing regimes. From this view, for 
example the Chinese opening (kaifang) and market reform policies are about practical solutions and 
specific assemblages to specific problems, and the meeting and contradiction of different political, 
economic and ethical rationalities. They are where neoliberal logic, standards of statehood, welfare 
of the people and other rationales come together as the production of new spaces of exception. (Ong 
2004, 72–75.) The state’s infrastructural power can be ‘carried in’ by actors and practices that are not 
state-related. For example NGO-led projects, if they inhere to state-making institutions or rules, can 
become the vessels of statization. An example are development projects that aim at formalising land 
rights of nomadic people. While possibly protecting the land of the people against land grabbing, they 
also transform customary land rights to official, often contradictory, forms of state-initiated 
categorisations and definitions of property rights. (Woods 2010, 9.) 
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The more similar is the execution of state-related policies, the more centralised and coherent can the 
state effect thought to be. However, declining central power in the sense of the centre being less able 
to enforce its decisions does not necessarily mean that state power or the effectiveness of the political 
system is declining. In everyday life, local governments represent the central state to ordinary people. 
Be the policies or decisions made in whatever ‘scale’ of the government, their enforcement appears 
state-initiated anyway. (Zhong 2003, 8.) Diffused power is created in social interaction, and social 
and market-based association, not through centralised command. This form of power is created by 
human agency and has to be sustained by legitimate collective action. It is based upon networks that 
can be, but are not necessarily, constrained by the central territorial authority. If they are, diffused 
power becomes territorial and authoritative as well. However, diffused power does not have to be and 
often is not territorially restricted but rather restricted by the purpose of the social or market 
interaction. (Agnew 2005, 442–443.) State-related policies can be important drivers in the exercise 
of this kind of more disaggregated power (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 406). 
States do not even necessarily hold a monopoly over the means of coercion. Instead, they can have a 
number of agreements, both spoken and unspoken, with other sources of authority. This does not 
necessarily mean disorder and conflict, but can enforce the state’s power by giving access to people, 
issues or areas state powers were not able to reach before. (Brown 2012, 61–62.) For example in the 
histories of European statizaton, what are now considered state and non-state actors had a symbiotic 
relationship in state-making. ‘Military entrepreneurs’ traded their ability to threaten with or use 
violence. The lack of monopoly of violence of state actors could be supplemented with informal local 
relationships with powerful and armed local actors. (Gallant 1999, 26–27; cited in Brown 2012, 62.) 
The degree to which ‘private violence’ is deemed legitimate or illegitimate, the boundary of illicitness, 
shifts in “historical and ongoing struggles over legitimacy, in the course of which powerful groups 
succeed in delegitimizing and criminalizing certain practices”. To varying degrees in the course of 
time and space, bandits make states and state make bandits. (Abraham & van Schendel 2005, 7–8.) 
Great Britain’s new private police force (see e.g. Potter 2015) is a case in point of the changing 
relationship between public and private in a ‘traditional’ strong Westphalian state. The diminishing 
presence of the police due to budget cuts (see e.g. Dodd 2014) is compensated with modern-age 
military entrepreneurs.  
Additionally, the separation of transnational companies (as representatives of the private, the society) 
and the state gives leeway in the ways goals can be pursued. If firms are understood to be outside of 
the formal political order, they can pursue goals differently than what would be accepted of a state 
institution. (Mitchell 1991, 89–90.) The Chinese attempt to control internal issues transnationally 
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reflects the state’s ability as a sovereign to authoritatively define the political (and the non-political). 
Political in this context means the things that are subject to state coercion. What is not political can 
be delegated to non-state actors and with that, it becomes something else – economic, religious, 
cultural… What is defined as political or economic creates possibilities (as well as impossibilities) 
for the exercise of power. For example the production, sale, and consumption of tobacco are in most 
countries left to the private sphere. The production, sale, and consumption of cocaine, however, are 
defined illegal and as such as something belonging to the political sphere. As such, the state becomes 
the relevant authority to abolish the production, distribution and use of cocaine both domestically and 
internationally. Tobacco can cross borders freely whereas the flow of cocaine is prevented by an 
international prohibition regime. This separation of the economic realm from the political is done in 
a way that seems natural to us despite the relatively short history of the separation. (Thomson 1995, 
222.) 
Similarly, the imagined separation of the state and the society enabled Western NGOs to work in 
Myanmar even though the diplomatic relations and economic relations were frozen under sanctions. 
Even though the NGOs receive funding from state institutions and have most likely aligned their 
policies with state development policies, they are not perceived as acting as part of the state. For 
example, the marketization of state branches, such as SOEs, helps the relocation of state sovereignty 
to areas external to the state’s geographical borders. The marketised corporations, still under the 
supervision of the state, “take up power, authority and legal legitimacy to the detriment of subaltern 
population” and in effect ‘make way’ for the transnationalisation of state sovereignty. These 
“transnational sovereignty arrangements” operate through states and legislations and are not only 
market practices, but also diplomatic and governmental in nature. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 409.)  
Even though we take the “public” and “private” organisation as networks of power and regulation 
enmeshed together, it does not mean that we should take them to be “a single, totalized structure of 
power”. Instead, there are always conflicts and contestation between and within them. (Mitchell 1991, 
90.) Additionally, as state and its power are constituted and transformed in the multiplicity of local 
encounters mould the spaces where state agents come into contact with other agents, but are also 
themselves shaped by them. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 403–404.)  
To summarise, all power relations are eventually realised in everyday practices and encounters of 
people. The state structure is not self-evidently the dominate factor and reason of everyday practices 
what guides the action of individuals. However, as the state scale does appear in social relations, and 
creates relations of spatial power, it does also have real power and effects, but is an effect itself as 
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well. However, in the fuzziness of reality, practices can deviate from existing norms and transform 
them; not all exercise of state power is successful or effective. (Ettlinger 2011, 548–549.) What comes 
essential then, is to study the intended as well as unintended effects of the use of power. The focus of 
this thesis is how territorialisation is produced through state territorial strategies on the one hand, 
carried ‘in’ by various actors and processes, intentionally and not, as well as how other processes and 
struggles for political authority can also produce it in effect, as a side-product. Territorialisation as a 
concept is defined in the next section. 
 
4.3. No territory, no state? Territorialisation as a sociospatial strategy  
I take territory19 to be one possible form of organisation of space. In the Western world, the territorial 
organisation of state and society has developed to be the dominant view of how space should be 
organised. However, this is not the case everywhere in the world nor is it absolute anywhere in the 
world but rather in process of becoming and retreating, being created and dismantled. I follow the 
lines of Edward Soja’s (1971) argument on the political organisation of space; its purpose is to shape 
the sociospatial processes of competition, conflict and cooperation of the society to maintain solidary 
(and peace) within it. The control of resources, such as land and power, the enforcement of authority 
and order, and “the legitimation of authority through societal integration” are instrumental in the 
organisation of space. (Soja 1971, 7; cited in Elden 2010, 803–804.) All these aspects are inherent in 
the concept of territory but it is only on possible form of spatial organisation, it does not refer to all 
forms of spatiality (Kuus & Agnew 2008, 101).  
In this thesis, territory comprises of an idea of a unit of space of sociospatial organisation that is 
bordered (Kuus & Agnew 2008, 101); political authority is exercised within it, control of resources 
is organised under that authority and society is attempted to be contained within it. Therefore, territory 
is not a static unit of space, but it is used “for political, social and economic ends” (Agnew 2005, 
441). It is used to establish control and access of resources but also the ordering and organizing 
people’s lives as well as their activities and livelihoods (Das 2014, 72).  Territory should be viewed 
as a porous and by no means perpetual product of networked practices, not as some “timeless or solid 
geographical foundation of state power”. For example, the (seeming) territoriality of the state has to 
be constantly constructed and politically mobilised. Therefore, “territory should be examined not as 
an actual state space, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such spaces 
                                                            
19 See Painter (2010) for other usages. Territory is widely used concept but has become rather void (or, from another 
perspective, too full) of meaning. Very rarely is it defined what it is actually used to refer to. 
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appear to exist”. (Painter 2010, 1115–1116.) Territorialisation in turn is a strategy of practices that 
makes territory appear to exist. 
Territory “is a bounded space which there is a compulsion to defend and secure—to claim a particular 
kind of sovereignty—against infringements by others who are perceived to not belong” (Cowen and 
Gilbert 2008, 16; cited in Painter 2010, 1097). The making and sustaining of borders is essential for 
territory. The bordering of territory is based on domination or control as the modality of power. It is 
possible that the exercise of that power is legitimate, but it is nonetheless based on demarcation 
through domination. The bordering aspect of territoriality requires border control and enforcing 
commands hierarchically throughout the territory. (Agnew 2005, 442.) This makes territoriality 
conflictual in its nature as it generates rival territories. To maintain and reproduce the borders of the 
given territory, it is necessary to create practices and discourses of the other(s). (van Schendel 2005, 
3; cited in Das 2014, 69.)  
Territorialisation is about the making or expanding of territories. It is about moving the borders inside 
of which claims to political authority are made. State territorialisation strategies can be viewed as 
attempts to “create and impose a form of spatiality that both serves the ends of the state and seeks the 
systematic annihilation of non-state spatial alternatives”. (Lefebvre 1991, 9–30; cited in Neep 2013, 
75.) In time, the border becomes more and more a part of the daily life and the memory of the old 
organisation fades away. Old cross-border networks grow weaker and new networks, like those of 
smuggling, are created because the border is accepted as a fixed reality. Eventually, the border can 
change from a social fact to a naturalised one, but it still must be maintained. (van Schendel 2005, 
373.)  
What is essential here is that territorialisation does not happen in a physically or socially empty place 
but it will have to compete with the existing forms of sociospatial organisation; the territorialisation 
of space confronts lived space. This makes the space contested in various ways. For example, 
nomadic lifestyle does not fit in strictly bordered space very well as it is based on constant movement. 
The relations and identity of the nomadic people are based on their relations to each other, not to the 
space they inhabit. To make territorialisation stick, promoting permanent cultivation can be used as 
a state territorial strategy to control resources. (Das 2014, 71–72.) State territorialisation and the 
related monopolisation of land and resources can also bring about civil war and peripheral conflicts 
as local power-holders and ordinary people resent what state territorialisation and the spatialisation 
of power bring with them, such as marginalisation of minority groups and extraction of resources that 
have belonged to that group. (Brown 2012, 68–69.) Multiple territorial claims can be made at a given 
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point in time and these claims can be made by various actors, not only states and many may have 
authority, though not exclusive, and power. In such an instance, the one exercising more de facto 
capacity to enforce decisions and control actions will have more influence even if another source has 
the de jure authority. (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 389.) 
Tongchai Winichakul’s (1994) concept of geo-body links territorialisation strategies with the spatial 
creation of nationhood. Like territorialisation strategies, the geo-body of a nation is socially 
constructed and it creates effects; “the geo-body of a nation is a man-made territorial definition which 
creates effects-by classifying, communicating, and enforcement-on people, things, and relationships”. 
(Tongchai 1994, 16–17.) In a way, a geo-body is the language a nation uses to achieve spatial 
expression; how it merges identity, culture and territory into an inseparable spatial and temporal 
whole. For example, the narrative of the geo-body of China, both in China and in the West, has long 
been based on a single-origin myth of how “a singular “Chinese culture” matching a homogenous 
ethnicity that spread out from the Yellow River valley some 5,000 years ago”. It makes the Chinese 
state seem as an inevitability that spreads from the centre and assimilates and homogenises on its way. 
(Oakes 2012, 316–317.)  
The discourse of geo-body makes the territoriality of the nation-state seem a natural fact that can be 
viewed on maps (Oakes 2012, 316). Therefore, perhaps the most important technology in creating 
and imagining a geo-body of a nation is modern mapping (Tongchai 1994, 16). Modern mapping 
helps conceptualise abstract space20 that is linear and homogenous, and can be cut into discrete, 
comparable units (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 388–389). When space is abstracted, smaller spaces 
nest in larger abstract space like a national park nests in national territory. This is in no way a neutral 
process; “[m]aps do more than represent reality; they are instruments by which state agencies draw 
boundaries, create territories, and make claims enforced by their courts of law”. (Vandergeest & 
Peluso 1995, 388–389.) This sort of abstract space is measurable and has empirically quantifiable 
physical dimensions. Theoretically, abstract space can be sold and bought like any commodity. It 
does not consider experienced space of “everyday routines, social interactions and lived experiences”. 
(Neep 2013, 75.) 
People do not respond to abstract and homogenous space pictured in maps and government policies 
because they experience space that multiform, “located, relative and varied”. More often than not, for 
                                                            
20 The abstract space of the state is how IR has long viewed state territoriality; as homogenous and total. One homogenous 
nation inhabits the abstract state space that is not further analysed. The lived experiences do not matter to most IR because 
they are not seen from the homogenous space that is the state. The way abstract space is ordered conceals the violence 
and artifice of its production and makes the national territory seem as the natural state form. (Neep 2013, 76.) 
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example “territorial land-use planning is […] often a utopian fiction unachievable in practice because 
of how it ignores and contradicts peoples’ lived social relationships and the histories of their 
interaction with the land”. For strategies creating abstract space to be successful in the long term, they 
will need to be accepted by the people over whom the authority claims are made. This is true for all 
kinds of spatial strategies This can be achieved with social pressure and/or the use of violence 
although with the latter it is difficult to achieve lasting acceptance. (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 389.) 
Local power-holders can also be bought off for example through provision of rents; for example 
insurgency groups can be transformed to border control groups like has been done in Myanmar (see 
further discussion in the analysis chapters) (Brown 2012, 69). 
Territorial strategies need to modified to local conditions to make them successful. For example in 
the Naga Hills between India and Burma in the late 19th and early 20th century, the territorialisation 
strategies were different from each side of the border as they were tuned to fit the local customs and 
social life. On the Indian side, land was given different meanings (e.g. for plantation/forest) and the 
arrangement of territorial control that had existed before was replaced by a cartographic imagination 
of space to secure the standing of colonial rule and companies in the area. On the Burmese side, the 
colonial rule was territorialised through village chiefs and headmen. They were given gifts, tax 
collection rights and slave release payments and persuaded to participate in “state revenue collection 
and “state making” practices”. The unadministered Naga people’s war-like habits, such as head-
taking and occasional slave-taking from the administered territories were used as legitimation for 
territorial expansion. In the colonial period it was common to base territorialisation strategies on 
bringing about order and civilisation. 21st century strategies include development and nationalisation. 
(Das 2014, 64–66; 69–70; 72.) 
Territorialisation is a strategy21 of practices to establish a territorial form of sociospatial organisation 
of life. Inherent in territorialisation is the creation, shifting and maintenance of various borders both 
in physical space and in social life that can be but need not be parallel with each other. One example 
of these borders are national borders, both based on ‘natural’ borders such as rivers and imagined 
borders. In addition, territorial bordering includes the bordering of social life inside the territory. Be 
it state or other source of political authority, the power and authority are claimed, appropriated and 
established on the lives of people physically residing within the territory. The routine of territory 
needs to be maintained to make the territorial borders to stick. It is “laboriously generated through 
                                                            
21 In this context, strategy is supposed to entail both conscious efforts to create a certain outcome as well as unintended 
effects that contribute to the goal of the strategy, which is here the establishment and maintenance of state territoriality. 
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complex uneven networks of countless mundane actions”, like control of border crossings, policing 
of smuggling and the issuing of visas. (Painter 2006, 765.) 
The spatial extension of rule does not need to be, and is not in many occasions, based on territoriality. 
Instead, it can be based, for example, upon kinship or movement and migration as is the case with 
nomadic people who base claims of ownership and control on cycles and routes of migration, not 
fixed territory. Additionally, even if a system of rule is territorial and relatively fixed, it does not need 
to be based upon exclusivity. (Ruggie 1993, 149.) For example amongst the tribes that have come to 
be called Kachin in Myanmar, organisation of social and political life is based upon kinship and 
lineage; individuals represent particular lineages and places. They have continued to be the basis of 
the Kachin society although the people associated with the lineages are separated in three state spaces. 
For example cross-boundary marriages are common; as Kachin from Myanmar marry to Kachin in 
China, they benefit from China’s economic development but do not lose their cultural and living 
environment that is not separated by international borders. (Dean 2005, 816–817.) 
Sociospatial change happens when spatial structures and spatial strategies, or in other words, 
emergent social and political projects, interact. “[A]gency lies with the social forces advancing such 
projects”. These forces have scalar dimensions and repercussions but are not scalar themselves. 
(MacKinnon 2011, 31.) Focus should be put on “processes of interaction and between inherited scales 
and emergent social activities”. This adds the dimension of time (duration) to the analysis. It connects 
the existing material and social realities inherited from the past to the new materialities and social 
relations and struggles of the present. It also emphasizes, how certain structures and practices can 
become (temporarily) sedimented and ‘fixed’. Scales are not vertically given but can become fixed 
in vertical positions for a certain duration of time. (MacKinnon 2011, 31.) 
Territorialisations of political authority can be viewed as trajectories of change of social and physical 
practices in time that co-exists in space. The trajectories and how they meet with each other and other 
trajectories vary in different contexts. There are many other sociospatial strategies that can be used 
to specialize political authority, but territorialisation and scaling were chosen for this thesis as the 
territoriality and the vertical organisation of national/global are important aspects of state as it is 
understood in IR but their meaning is usually not reflected upon. The reconceptualization helps us 
see that for example fluctuations in state territorialisation are not in any way unique to the era of 
globalisation. Rather, territoriality is only one of many possible forms of spatial organisation of 
political authority, contested by physical and social space, discourses and practices, and alternative 
trajectories of sociospatial organisation.  
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To summarise, territorialisation is about creating borders and excluding other forms of authority from 
the territory, which is bordered space. Scaling on the other hand is about establishing relations of 
power between spaces. Scaling does not (necessarily) aim at excluding but establishing a relation to 
other forms of authority. Both of these spatial strategies are constructed, maintained and contested. 
Certain organisation can become to be seen as fixed, but that does not mean that the form would be 
something natural or permanent, even less something existing a priori. Both of the strategies have 
both materially and socially real effects and territoriality and scale are themselves effects of 
sociospatial struggles. 
45 
 
5. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY: SINO-BURMESE BORDERLANDS  
In the following chapters, I will apply my formulations about political authority, power relations, and 
territorialisation to cases from the Sino-Burmese borderlands. Both China and Myanmar make 
interesting cases for this kind of analysis. First of all, the rise of China is without a doubt one of the 
big issues of our time and as such, understanding the Chinese state is of importance to any political 
analysis. Additionally, after the Maoist era, China has embraced, albeit with many reservations and 
with a ‘Chinese flair’, modernisation and capitalism, the two arguably most powerful processes of 
the last century or two. In my view, to understand the complexity of the ‘Chinese century’, we need 
to look not only in the growing power of China in Africa or Latin America. Southeast Asia is often 
seen as the natural backyard of China, and as such provides a good observation site for analysis trying 
to understand the multifaceted realities, trajectories and the actors involved with historical perspective. 
The Chinese state, what ‘Chinese’ is, as well as the identities, statehood and spaces of power of the 
neighbouring small countries are constantly renegotiated where China meets Southeast Asia. It is 
something much more complex than the big dragon using its economic power to bully the small tigers 
next to it. (Tan 2012, 87–88.)  
It was actually the democratization and opening up of Myanmar from 2010 onwards was what 
initiated my interest towards the country and the Southeast Asian region as a whole. A seemingly 
sovereign, closed state had started opening up to the world, and with it, foreign actors, values and 
identities. For a few years, Myanmar was celebrated as another victory of Western values and 
neoliberal capitalism; triumph of democracy over totalitarianism, capitalism over socialism. 
Myanmar seemed to be following the teleological path towards capitalist modernity. At the same time 
there was a sense of great hurry; China, as Myanmar’s big powerful neighbour, had worked with the 
country when Western countries stayed away, and had grasped much of the country’s economic life 
and natural resources. The Sino-Burmese borderlands make an excellent case of a sphere where local 
traditions, history, social conditions and institutions come together with modernist Western 
discourses. On the one hand, there are nationalist modernist projects going on; national subjects are 
“culturally homogenized, biopoliticed, and localized within the national territory”. On the other hand, 
at the same time, in the capitalist modernist view, subjects that are hybrid and flexible, and that have 
transnationally, not only nationally, laying solidarities, are celebrated. (Ong 1997, 171; 173.)  
Southeast Asia is a good example how an existing power relations came in contact with Western 
standards of statehood.  In the pre-colonial time, political authority was centralised in economic 
centres with the royal families. Power and ability to control radiated from the centre, and the 
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hinterlands were affected by it only to a low degree, if at all. The peripheral hinterlands were not 
based on centralised rule due to, in part at least, difficult physical terrain they had they had to deal 
with it. The acceptance of the local population was instrumental to the exercise of power because 
compliance could not be guaranteed with force. The hinterlands that were more based on diffused 
than central power resisted colonial rule more effectively than the centres of power, and the 
colonialists were not able to directly control all of them. In independence transitions, the international 
standards of statehood and nationalism became powerful state-making tools, and fresh independent 
governments adopted Westphalian ideals, such as territoriality, and colonial practices to achieve them. 
Existing multiple and overlapping sovereignties were to be forged into one absolute sovereign. 
(Brown 2012, 65–66.)  
In this chapter, I will introduce some aspects of both China and Myanmar that are relevant to the later 
analysis. The focus of this thesis is on the territorialisation of the Burmese state, and to a lesser degree 
that of China, in the borderlands. The focus of the analysis is on state territorialisation in the context 
of ceasefire agreements in Myanmar, and the liberalisation of trade in both countries that has enabled 
private ownership, opened cross-border trade, and raised the presence of the state in the borderlands. 
Temporally, in the case studies the focus is on the period of 1988–2010. The year 1988 transformed 
the official relations of the countries in significant ways as both regimes started opening up their 
economy. In 2010, after two decades of having close economic and political relations without much 
outside interference, thanks to the sanctions set by Western countries on Myanmar, Myanmar opened 
up to the rest of the world. This will most likely in time transform the relations between the two 
countries, but that would be enough analysing for another whole thesis.  
Because I take power relations are taken to be constructed and contested in the mundane, in the 
everyday practices, it follows suit that my analysis needs to move from the actor, the microscale, to 
the meso- and macroscales. The analysis should ne ascending, not top-down, because “mundane, 
everyday practices are part of a macroscale societal picture, precisely because power is diffuse, 
signifying that everyday practices produce, reproduce, and elaborate societal norms”. Ascending 
analysis begins with specific practices, like in the case of making of borders, border controls and 
cross-border mobility, not from larger structures as the dominating factor. (Ettlinger 2011, 548; 
following Foucault 1980b–d; 2007b.) However, I saw it fit to first introduce some larger contexts as 
they do play a role in what plays out in the everyday life. I do not assume state policies to predetermine 
what ordinary people, or even government officials do but rather as larger background contexts that 
do have some relevance in the local encounters. Additionally, it is important to notice that  issues 
brought to the fore in this chapter are not, however, to be taken as primary or the most influential 
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factors in how political authority spatialities form at the local level. Based on my analysis in the 
territorialisation practices, I have noticed that actors traditionally defined as private, play a significant 
role in the contestation as well as construction of the state, and therefore special attention is given to 
them here as well. 
 
5.1. Myanmar: Colonial geo-body, military rules, and competing nationalisms 
Myanmar is located in Southeast Asia. Its neighbouring countries are Bangladesh and India in the 
west, China and Laos in the north/northeast and Thailand in the east. Myanmar has a long coastline 
in the Indian Ocean which makes it strategically important especially to China (and to the US). The 
physical geography of the country is characterised by the lowlands in the centre of the country and 
delta in the south that are surrounded by highlands that form a horseshoe-like ring. (Brown 2012, 
112.) The current estimated population of the country is over 60 million and there are approximately 
135 national races. Myanmar is divided into 14 states, in seven (Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Chin, Mon, 
Arakan and Shan) of which the majority of the population is ethnic minorities. (Burma Center Prague 
2014.) Most people identifies with the ethnic majority group, ethnic Bamars, or Burmans, reside in 
the lowlands. Approximately two thirds of the total population are Burmans. The ethnic minorities 
populate the mountainous highlands. The royal rule of the lowlands in pre-colonial times was based 
in the centre and the hills acted as refuge for peasants, rebels and other mobile people, as well as a 
“practical space of subversion to the central monarch”. (Brown 2012, 112; 114.) 
The country came under British colonial rule as a province of British India after the three Anglo-
Burmese Wars, all won by the British. The southern parts of the territory now linked to the state of 
Myanmar, were taken over in the first and second war in 1824–1826 and 1852. The constituted the 
main geo-body of ‘Burma Proper’. The Northern high-lands, known as ‘Frontier Areas’, was taken 
over in the third war in 1885–1886. Whereas ‘Burma Proper’ was administered directly by the 
colonial administration, the ‘Frontier Areas’, were governed indirectly through local Kachin and Shan 
chiefs. Karenni States were left out of both of the areas, as a buffer zone between the frontiers and 
the centre, administered indirectly much like the ‘Frontier Areas’. (Heikkilä-Horn 2009, 145–147.) 
Before the British colonialization, the geographical area that now is Myanmar had never been under 
one rule nor was it thought of as one geographical entity (Burma Center Prague 2014). 
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Map 1. The 14 states and their capitols of Myanmar. 
 
Note: The capitol of Myanmar is currently Nay Pyi Taw, not Rangoon. 
Source: CIA (2013). 
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During the colonial period, Burmese, as well as ethnic, nationalism emerged for the first time. 
However, the British would not accept any ethnic state but enforced the first cartographically precise 
borders; an internationally recognised and sanctioned state of Burma that put ethnic groups under the 
jurisdiction of a state they did not participate in. (Malseed 2009, 367–368.) The ethnic and 
geographical divisions of what is now known as Myanmar are remnants of the colonial period when 
the British divided Burma; “[t]here was no ‘Burma’ before the British started to ‘imagine’ it as a 
particular entity east of the British Raj and gave it a ‘geo-body’ by mapping it” (Heikkilä-Horn 2009, 
145). The Sino-Burmese border evolved as Burma (1948) and the People’s Republic of China (1949) 
were established as independent states but was not settled until 1960 because the PRC saw the border 
defined by the British as imposed on it. In the border settlement, two areas from Kachin22 and Wa 
states were recognised as Chinese territory. (Dean 2005, 813.) However, the border has never been 
effectively enforced from either side and cross-border mobility has never stopped because most of 
the families are spread on both sides and many Dais used to live on the Burmese side. There is no 
natural borderline and no artificial one either; the border can be crossed through forests or paddy 
fields. (Weng 2006, 200.) 
When the territory known as Burma was mapped, further divisions were based on partly geographical 
and partly ethnic groupings. This categorised the population into different ethnic groups and the 
categorisation favoured some groups over others. The groupings moved on to the independent state 
of Burma and in the constitution of 1947 four ethnically based states (Kachin, China, Karenni and 
Shan) were created to which later three more (Karen, Arakanese and Mon) were added. Kachin, Chin 
and Shan elites participated in the Panglong conference where the constitution was drafted. (Heikkilä-
Horn 2009, 150–151.) Ethnic states were endowed with different rights, some with a potential for 
secession, many without. The new Burmese state endowed itself with sovereignty over the Burman 
lowland areas as well as frontier highland areas that were governed by ethnic minorities that the state 
was not de facto able to control. (Oh 2013, 5–6.)  
After gaining independence, Burma/Myanmar has been ruled by four major political regimes. In 
1948–1962, the regime was based on a British-style parliamentary government. (Kyaw 2002, 78.) 
The ruling party was the nationalist Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League AFPFL 23  that was 
                                                            
22 The concession of the Kachin area was one of the factors behind the outbreak of violence in Kachin state by the Kachin 
Independence Organisation (KIO) in 1961 (Dean 2005, 815). See for more discussion on the conflicts along the border in 
section 6.1. 
23 AFPFL’s predecessor Anti-Fascist Organisation (AFO) was created to resist the Japanese occupation of Burma. Later, 
it was renamed AFPFL. It consisted of various nationalist parties, and before the independence of the country, its primary 
objective was to resist the British colonialization. (Thawnghmung 2011, 6–8.) 
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committed to social welfare and market economy. Soon after independence, dissatisfied ethnic 
groups24 took up to arms and the country was stridden with civil war. Soon the AFPFL was split. The 
military took the position of a care-taker for the government in 1958–1960 to restore stability, and in 
1962 the Revolutionary Council (RC) seized power altogether. (Thawnghmung 2011, 5–8.) The RC 
adopted the Burmese Way to Socialism instead of capitalism, and replaced the multiparty 
parliamentary system with a single-party system by the Burma Socialist Program Party25 (BSPP) that 
was established by the RC. (Kyaw 2002, 78.)  
During the socialist regime, the Tatmadaw fought with armed groups on various fronts. The social 
order in cities deteriorated in 1988 as non-armed civilians living in the government-controlled areas 
participated in unrepresented numbers in demonstrations against the socialist government. The 
legitimacy of the ruling party BSPP deteriorated, and the situation was made worse by bad handling 
of demonstrations. Many peaceful demonstrations turned violent to the point that there were fears of 
the state collapsing. The state had to concentrate on handling the situation in cities and left the border 
regions to be. The political situation with the opposition got stuck in a deadlock by September 1988 
and both the US as well as the PRC prepared for intervening. The BSPP leaders decided to let the 
Tatmadaw, the state armed forces, take over the state. The BSPP was replaced with the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) that was renamed in 1997 the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC). (Maung 2007a, 9–13.) The junta rebuilt collapsed socialist institutions and promised 
to establish a market economy (Kyaw 2002, 79). 
In 1990, free multi-party elections were held and won by the opposition’s National League for 
Democracy (NLD), in which many ethnic leaders ran as candidates, and that got roughly 60 per cent 
of the votes and almost 81 per cent of the seats. (Maung 2007a, 1.) However, after the elections, 
SLORC would not hand over power to NLD but instead oversaw the national convention draft a new 
constitution. The highly junta-controlled convention was held on various occasions until 2008. 
(Thawnghmung 2011, 8–9.) In 2010, the first democratic elections since 1990 were held, although 
they were dismissed by many as a disguise to continued military dictatorship. However, the 
Tatmadaw initiated extensive reforms in the country, and in 2012 by-elections, NLD won 43 seats.   
                                                            
24 For example the Kachin and Shan elites seemed to be satisfied with the constitutional arrangements that empowered 
state councils to make laws and raise taxes. However, dissatisfaction amongst the population of the two states soon grew 
due to many things, such as failure of the government to provide economic assistance to them, and the promotion of 
Buddhism in Kachin state where the majority of the population is Christian. (Thawnghmung 2011, 5–6.) 
25 The BSPP mixed socialism, Buddhism and isolationism in its policies. Under BSPP rule Burma co-operated with other 
socialist countries. (Burma Center Prague 2014.) 
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I will concentrate on the Kachin and Shan state because they are located next to the Yunnan province 
border and are areas where political authority’s linkage to territory is constantly attested. Myanmar 
has never been able to control its border with China (Steinberg 2001, 225). Both states are home to 
many different ethnic groups of which the most relevant to this study are the Kachin, Wa and Kokung. 
Both of the states are rich in natural resources like forests, gems, minerals, rivers and fertile lands that 
make outside forces interested in them. These resources are threatened e.g. by deforestation, climate 
change, illegal wildlife trade and construction of large dams. The natural resources and their 
exploitation have fuelled conflicts in the states. (Wai 2012, 48–49.) Approximately 65 per cent of 
FDI to Myanmar goes to Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states of whom especially the Kachin and Shan 
have been targeted for land deals for companies operating in mining, hydropower, logging and 
agribusiness sectors (Kramer & Woods 2012, 12). China and Myanmar share a 2,185-kilometer-long 
mountainous border along Yunnan province on the Chinese side and Kachin and Shan (northern half) 
states on the Burmese side. 
The Kachin and Shan states bordering China are among these mountainous states that have escaped 
central control. The Kachin state borders China and India in the northernmost part of Myanmar. It 
has a population of approximately 1.5 million. (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 3; 6.) 
The ethnic majority are the Kachin who consist of various loosely affiliated tribes and clans but most 
commonly Kachins describe themselves as consisting of six tribes. The Kachin nationalist project can 
be considered one of the most successful ones in Burma as the definition of a Kachin nation has been 
internalised by most of those who identify themselves as Kachin. Most of the Kachin live in Kachin 
state but some live in neighbouring territories in China and India as well as in other parts of Myanmar. 
(Thawnghmung 2011, 14.) Most Kachins live on shifting cultivation of rice, and the state’s economy 
is based on agriculture. However, the state has rich natural resources including jade and timber that 
have made some local entrepreneurs very rich. Many Kachin feel left out of state-initiated activities 
that have benefited non-Kachin residents of the state, such as Chinese investors. These include the 
commercialization of agriculture and natural resources exploitation. (Thawnghmung 2011, 14.) 
The Shan state is the biggest ethnic state in Myanmar both territory- and population-wise with 
approximately six to seven million people. The state borders not only China but also Laos and 
Thailand. The ethnic majority are the Shan, but many other ethnicities, including Kachin people, 
reside in the area. Some Shan live in the Kachin state. The state has never been effectively unified 
due to mountainous terrain and thick jungles, and many competing authorities, such as chieftains and 
war-lords. Like most of Myanmar, also the Shan state is primarily rural. Like the Kachin state, it is 
also rich in natural resources such as minerals and precious stones. It is also known for poppy 
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cultivation as it is part of the Golden Triangle that produces much of the world’s heroin. 
(Thawnghmung 2011, 15.) Opium production and trade have been the state’s economic backbone for 
decades after the CPC came to power in China and prohibited opium. The losing side of the raise to 
power in China, the Nationalist Chinese (Kuomintang), retreated and set up militia in the mountains 
of Shan state along the Chinese border. In Wa Hills, the CPB that could not work in mainstream 
politics anymore, set up their underground armed activities. Both groups became were involved in 
the drug trade, and the ethnic Chinese became a source of finance capital to opium farmers and traders. 
(Woods 2013, 6–7.) 
 
5.2. China: “The sky is high and the emperor is far away”?26 
The legal territory of People’s Republic of China (PRC) covers approximately 9,600 square 
kilometres of which 60 per cent is mountains and plateaus. The western part of China is landlocked 
and characterised by mountains ranging from the 4,000-metre plateau in the farthest west to highlands 
that are about 1,000 to 2,000 metres above sea level. The lowlands of the eastern provinces with 
warmer climate and access to sea make them more conducive to framing and trade than the western 
landlocked provinces although when China’s trade was based on the Silk Route, they were more 
central economically than the current economic centres in the eats. (Démurger et al. 2002, 154.) 
Mobility in physical space and mobility in social hierarchy have long been linked in the traditions of 
the imperial China. To gain social opportunities, such as education or high office, people had to move 
from rural areas towards the urban centres. Power and prestige correlated with the physical location 
of the person; space was imagined to be arranged vertically. The Maoist era failed to eliminate the 
differences between rural and urban areas despite of efforts to ‘reverse’ the social hierarchy of space 
by moving city people to the country side. In the post-reform China, power and prestige are perceived 
to be located in regions that are most affected by overseas investments and economic reforms. Getting 
access to the centres of power, such as special economic zones, is one of the central concerns of the 
everyday lives of the Chinese. (Liu 1997, 92–93.) 
 
 
                                                            
26 A Chinese proverb that describes the attitudes of local government officials toward the central government (Zhong 
2003). 
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Map 2. The provinces, regions and municipalities of China. 
 
Source: CIA (2012). 
 
 
54 
 
Perhaps the biggest reform China has gone through after its opening up in 1979 is the increasing 
economic mobility, the reach of enterprises to national and international markets, inside and outside 
the country. (Hendrischke 2006, 93.) Gonzalez-Vicente (2011) has argued that China has adopted an 
‘entrepreneurial statehood’. One manifestation is the ‘Going Out’ strategy in the 21st century that 
combines foreign policy and international activities of Chinese enterprises, both state-owned and 
private. The strategy has aimed at encouraging firms to go abroad and provide the managers with 
skills and knowledge needed in it as well as giving institutional support to these kinds of activities 
for example by simplifying requirements and easing the access to credit. The official incentive behind 
the strategy is to better the global position of Chinese companies so that they are in a good position 
to lead industrial development. On the other hand the state aims to control the internationalization of 
Chinese enterprises and includes them in broader foreign policy objectives, but also allows for 
managerial autonomy to companies. The centrality of SOEs in the rhetoric as well as practice of 
China’s foreign policies ties them to the state apparatus and the central government (Gonzalez-
Vicente 2011, 402; 404).  
Behind it and the resulting decentred internationalization process the Chinese state, he identifies three 
parallel drivers: central government planning, SOE and SLC strategies and local contingencies once 
the companies have gone overseas. Through the interaction of these drivers the Chinese state gains 
more international presence and is at the same time transformed itself. This transformation is 
produced by territorialisation processes and cultural encounters. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405.) 
While the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the highest body of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), holds the ultimate decision-making power in foreign policy, there is a myriad of other actors, 
both official and others, that affect foreign policy. Already the official actors (e.g. CPC organs, 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) departments, government agencies) hold various motives and 
visions of Chinese national interest not to mention other influencing actors such as academic experts, 
local officials, chief executives and bank directors. Also the media and popular opinion have a 
growing influence. (Jakobson & Knox 2010, 1.) 
One special flair of the economy of China is also the large, influential SOEs. According to the Forbes 
500 list in 2013, 10 largest Chinese companies are all state-owned except for one Hong Kong -based 
one (CNNMoney 2014). Many of them hold practical monopolies in their respective fields. Many 
current big SOEs have evolved from former ministries, for example PetroChina from Ministry of 
Petroleum and Sinopec from Ministry of Petroleum and Ministry of Chemical Industry. The central 
government controls and guides Chinese companies to a certain degree. In the case of SOEs and state-
owned banks, the state remains the majority stake-holder. However they are becoming more and more 
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like multinational companies than government branches. When SOEs and state-owned banks listed 
to the international stock markets, their objectives went through a transformation. They had to become 
concerned about Fortune 500 rankings as well as profit maximization. In order to attract foreign 
investments, they have to adhere with international rules. The involvement of international private 
stakeholders and investors has created a mixture of public ownership, and transnational and private 
ownership. This has restricted the central government’s ability to control the SOEs and the state-
owned banks. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405.) Most significant SOEs practically have a monopoly in 
their respective field (Morck et al. 2008, 340). Most of China’s FDI originates from SOEs (in 2006, 
82% of total non-financial outward FDI) even though in 2006 they only comprised 26% of the number 
of establishments with overseas investments (Yeung & Liu 2008, 67–68). The only “FDI 
heavyweights” not explicitly controlled by the state are Lenovo and Huawei (Morck et al. 2006, 340). 
Even though the state-owned sector is still the dominating business sector in China, private sector has 
been growing rapidly ever since private ownership has been possible. Private personal property and 
ownership have been protected by the constitution since 1999 and in 2004 private assets and capital 
since 2004. The state was the sole owner of the SOEs until 1995 when it was decided to “grasp the 
large and let go of the small”; smaller SOEs were sold to private individuals. Most Chinese private 
companies, be they domestic or foreign-controlled, are based on former SOEs or collectives. POEs 
have also been established on former township and village enterprises (TVEs). (Ralston et al. 2006, 
826–827.)  The growth of the private sector has brought a class of the ‘nouveaux riches’ in China and 
in its part increased the domestic saving rate. (Li 2001, 223; 227–228.) Domestic private-owned 
enterprises (POEs) contribute about one third of China’s GDP even though they have only recently 
become well established. Contrary to the export-driven SOEs, the POEs produce goods and services 
to the domestic market. The POEs have traditionally been discriminated against by limited loans and 
resources, higher taxes and banning certain industries from private companies. (Ralston et al. 2006, 
826–827.) 
The importance of private companies to the economy has been recognized since the late 1990s. Only 
recently have they started to get the same encouragement and rewards as the SOEs (Ralston et al. 
2006, 826–827). The central government actively encourages and supports private-owned Chinese 
companies in their internationalization as well. The central government controls several tax revenues 
with which it can finance the “going out” of these companies. (Yeung & Liu 2008, 62.) Additionally, 
the easy line of credit from Chinese policy banks has helped Huawei to undercut its competitors’ bids 
in acquisitions. Even when acquisitions are more private in nature, they have to be approved by the 
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Ministry of Commerce. The state can also control overseas investments and cash flows by controlling 
currency exchange. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 405–406.) 
In the last two decades of reformation and restructuring of the SOEs, the state sector has shrunk and 
the importance of the SOEs in the economy has been downplayed. They still do play an integral part 
in many strategically valuable sectors, such as raw materials, energy resources and banking. (Ralston 
et al. 2006, 827.) At the same time, economic reform has also made it possible for local governments 
to raise some taxes and also establish town and village enterprises (TVEs) outside the state planning 
structure. These enterprises are often founded by party cadres and well-connected entrepreneurs. 
(Yeung & Liu 2008, 62.) These low-educated “self-made” entrepreneurs became rich when the TVEs 
grew rapidly in the early 1980s (Li 2001, 223; 227–228). Many of these TVEs have grown or 
transformed to transnational companies (Yeung & Liu 2008, 62). Central government policies are not 
necessarily implemented on the local government level but instead they can be modified to fit local 
circumstances. Therefore, two localities are not necessarily similar to each other. This has resulted 
for example to the ‘fuzziness’ of property rights; a mixture of formal and informal property rights. 
This localises the conflicts as there is no higher authority were e.g. entrepreneurs could take their case 
than the local authorities. (Hendrischke 2006, 96.) 
The majority of SOE shares are non-tradable and are owned by the state and state-controlled 
institutions, such as other SOEs. Thus the state owns the majority of the shares and with that, the 
ultimate decision-making power. All of the internationally listed SOEs have a parallel authority 
structure in addition to the board – the Party Committee of the enterprise. The Party Secretary and 
Party Committee members hold most of the real decision-making power and authority whether they 
sit in the board or not. If the board and top executives are not Party members, they have little or no 
real authority. (Morck et al. 2008, 343.) SOEs and SLCs can be seen as a part of the state apparatus 
because of their ownership structure, administrative arrangements, their centrality in the state’s 
foreign policy, the control of the Party of the appointments (and removals) of top SOE executives and 
their central role in the vision and leadership of the Party. As the ties between the Party and the SOEs 
are strong both at the institutional and personal level, the SOEs should not have an imperative to 
downsize the state apparatus. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 404.) 
The relationship between SOE executives and the political leadership is symbiotic – they both rely 
on each other. The SOEs benefit from state support (loans, foreign aid policies etc.) and the successful 
SOEs support the political leadership by supplying jobs and providing revenue to the state. The 
business executives and high-ranking officials have close personal ties. (Jakobson & Knox 2010, 25–
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26.) The appointments of CEOs and other senior managers of large national as well as local SOEs are 
directed by state institutions. The CEOs of the largest SOEs are appointed by the Communist Party 
of China’s Organizational Department and other senior positions mostly by the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Appointments to top-level positions are part 
of the careers of successful party bureaucrats. Exchanges of positions can happen quickly without 
prior notice to the shareholders. (Morck et al. 2008, 344.) Generally, however, SOE leaders do not 
attempt to affect foreign policy decisions that do not concern their respective business sector, but 
energy sector high executives do have the capability and can exercise it occasionally, for example 
when they are consulted as experts when foreign policy concerning their respective sector is being 
deliberated. Private business and local/regional government-owned enterprises’ executives do not 
have the same political capital. (Jakobson & Know 2010, 24–26.)  
SOEs cannot merely be seen as a unified strategic branch of the Chinese central government. Instead, 
with their internationalization the SOEs are becoming more and more independent from the 
government and its objectives and discourses and might even confront them. For example in Peru the 
SOE Shougang’s managers actively intervened in the workings of the Peruvian state by challenging 
the local elite and as such contradicted the Chinese foreign policy discourse of non-intervention. 
Other companies have transformed through joint ventures from predominantly Chinese to 
international entities their only responsibility to Beijing being profitability. It can thus be argued that 
with the state branches becoming more and more autonomous with their own distinctive motives and 
logics the state is becoming more heterogeneous as it internationalizes. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 
406–407.)  
Even though the SOEs are an integral strategic part of the state apparatus, their foremost principle is 
that of profit. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 404.) Sometimes the actions of SOEs (or other Chinese 
businesses for that matter) are in contrast with Chinese foreign policy goals. It is however hard to 
assess whether it’s because e.g. energy security trumps diplomatic concerns or because the companies 
are acting independently according to their own interests, not foreign policy ones. (Jakobson & Know 
2010, 29–30.) It is especially difficult for the state institutions to oversee, and even less, control, the 
national oil companies (NOC) because the companies have more resources and capacity than the 
institutions overseeing them. The leaders of NOCs are highly ranked in the CPC and the NOCs have 
an institutional background in former ministries which grants them with great deal of power. (Jiang 
& Sinton 2011, 7; 25.) Many Western as well as Chinese scholars27 have also questioned if it is the 
                                                            
27 E.g. Zha Daojing, Xin Ma and Philip Andrews-Speed. 
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state that pressures the companies to go overseas but rather that the firms are pushing the government 
to help them in competition with other companies (Zweig 2010, 9–10).  
Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente (2011) has argued that the internationalization and the re-territorialisation 
of the Chinese state takes place when state-owned enterprises go abroad and start pursuing their own 
goals, teaming up with various local business and governmental actors. He argues that the central 
government is not able to fully control the goals or the actions of the SOE’s, but that they have also 
goals of their own. This decentralized and fragmented process disperses and dislocates state power 
but does not take away its real effect. It also leads to transformed understandings of the state that are 
beyond the control of the central government. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 403.) By getting involved in 
the overseas investment projects and even pushing companies to go international, the Chinese central 
government is expanding to spheres formerly outside of the state sphere. The process is based on 
mixtures and fluctuating of the line between public and private, as well as communist and capitalist 
ideologies. Profitability and international expansion are the common objective of both the state and 
the companies although at the same time the internationalization process is diversifying private firm 
interests and with that the objectives of the state system. (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 406.) Often it is 
unclear whether Chinese companies are actors or tools of foreign policy.  
In my analysis, I focus on the Yunnan province in China, much like the neighbouring Kachin and 
Shan states, has been considered a backward hinterland in China. The terrain is marked by mountains 
that cover 94 per cent of the province. It is however the seventh biggest province in China and shares 
an international border of more than 8,800 kilometres with Myanmar, Laos and Viet Nam. (Poncet 
2006, 303.) The Yunnan province is further divided to 13 prefecture-level regions of which six share 
a border with Myanmar: Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture (AP), Lincang District, Dehong Dai 
and Jingpo AP, Simao District, Baoshan Municipality and Xishuangbanna Dai AP. Within these six 
regions, there are three national-level checkpoints that have been agreed both by the Chinese and 
Burmese governments. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 9; 17.) Yunnan has a significant population of non-Han 
ethnic groups (Démurger 2002, 158). The Dehong Dai and Jingpo AP is home to most of the Kachin 
living on the Chinese side of the Sino-Burmese border, and has also been the economically the fastest 
growing prefecture in Yunnan since 1982. (Dean 2005, 818.) F 
In Yunnan, until 2000, the formal state administration extended ‘lower’ than in other provinces; 
whereas in other parts of China, the ‘lowest’ level formal administration reaches is the township level, 
in Yunnan, the a village-level of government called the village office existed. These village offices 
were more vertically linked than village-ruled village committees in other provinces. However, they 
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lacked size, resources and budgetary independence to have real power. They were only capable of 
maintaining order instead of driving policy changes or economic development. Enterprises were not 
the concern of local administration, and they did not come as interconnected as in the rest of China. 
(Pieke 2004, 527–528.) The central government, although the local and provincial governments are 
able to enforce policies and decisions of their own as well, has ultimately most of the power to define 
the rules of the game that is state government. However, the local–central power relations are by no 
means a zero-sum game in which the increase of local power would result in a decrease of central 
power. (Zhong 2003, 8.) Overall, Chinese local governments have traditionally had room to pursue 
their own foreign economic and political interests, the degree varying in time. They have been able 
to resist total centralization by the central government. Yunnan and other border provinces have also 
implemented local-to-local diplomacy with local governments on the other side of the border to solve 
issues like smuggling, illegal immigration and drug trafficking (Cheung & Tang 2001, 92–93; 110–
111). In Yunnan, the provincial government has gained some independence from the central 
government and has been able to guide its own foreign and economic policies with Myanmar. 
Sometimes central guidelines have been disregarded due to conflicting local interests.  
People living along the border between the Yunnan province and Myanmar have traded and interacted 
with each other for centuries. Tight control over border regions has only restricted this exchange, not 
ever stopped it completely. (Kuah 2000, 72–73.) Ethnic Yunnanese traders have been an integral part 
of the borderlands societies and have had better access to Kachin and Shan natural resources and 
areas than colonial overlords during British rule, or the Burmese government after independence. 
(Woods 2013, 6.) For border provinces like Yunnan, economic ties with the neighbouring countries 
are more important than opening up international trade (as is the case with coastal provinces) (Cheung 
& Tang 2001, 110). Since the opening up from the 1980s forward, cross-border trade has increased 
and economic as well as social relations have been renewed between people living along the border 
between Myanmar and Yunnan. Also minority cultures have been revitalized. In Yunnan border trade 
and related activities with Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos make up more than 50 percent of its revenue. 
(Kuah 2000, 75.) ODI going from Yunnan to Myanmar is concentrated in the energy sector and 
agribusiness. Yunnan United Power Development (YUPD 28  develops hydropower resources in 
Myanmar. It signed a MoU to build China’s first build-operate-transfer29 (BOT) hydropower project 
                                                            
28 YUPD comprises Yunnan Huaneng Lancang River Hydropower Co., Yunnan Power Grid Co. and Yunnan Machinery 
Equipment Export-Import Co Ltd. (Maung 2007b, 18). 
29 YUPD builds and manages the station and operates it for 40 years after completion after which it is transferred to the 
Myanmar government (Maung 2007b, 18). 
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in Myanmar in 2006. YMEC plays also a big role in building hydropower plants. (Maung 2007b, 18; 
24.)  
 
5.3. Economic policies and public–private relationships  
The year 1989 marks a shift in the relations between China and Myanmar. In the 1960s and 1970s 
Burma, under the rule of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), had been in civil war, and 
China had isolated itself in the Cultural Revolution. Official border trade had been virtually in a 
standstill. Even after China started to open its borders in 1978, the Communist Party of Burma CPB 
was not able to engage in border trade because the northern border areas were under the rule of various 
armed groups. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 4.) Even on the Chinese side, the reforms that enabled provinces to 
implement their own economic agendas in the broader ‘space’ the central government awarded them 
in the name of economic development and socialist capitalism, favoured mainly the coastal 
provinces 30  (Cheung & Tang 2001, 93–94). The period of 1949–1978 the central government 
tightened its grip over foreign policies and provinces only facilitated the implementation of its 
agendas. (Cheung & Tang 2000, 92–93.) Border regions were heavily controlled because of political 
considerations and also the fear of social and moral pollution of the Chinese people. Officially, only 
some cross-border trade amongst people living in close proximity of the border was allowed to make 
up for shortages in or sell surplus of agricultural produce. The restrictions were however undermined 
by inefficient control, corruption and smuggling. It was not until the 1990s that the potential of border 
provinces for trade development was realized and policies favouring them were implemented. (Kuah 
2000, 72–77.) 
Burma’s foreign exchange holdings and international liquidity hit rock-bottom in 1988. In addition, 
all major donors but China cut off assistance to Myanmar due to the illegitimate regime change in 
1988. However, in 1989 the military regime started moderately opening up the private sector, joined 
Myanmar in regional cooperation schemes and organisations31, and sold a lot of the state’s resources. 
This gradual opening up coincided with the liberalization of the Chinese economy which further 
encouraged the development of the private sector in Myanmar, and enabled China to answer quickly 
to the new situation. (Steinberg 2001, 225; 229; 231.) Before the late 1980s, the Sino-Burmese 
                                                            
30 Especially during the 1980s the coastal provinces were the main beneficiaries as special economic zones (SEZs) were 
established and coastal cities developed to connect China to the global economy. (Kuah 2000, 74–75.)  
31 Myanmar joined for example the Greater Mekong Subregion31 (GMS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). This ended the former socialist regime’s isolationism and non-aligned neutralism. (Kudo 2010, 270.) 
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relations had been hindered by the (c)overt CPC support to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) 
that was behind some of the armed struggles32 against the Burmese socialist government. Just before 
the cold war, this Chinese dual-track diplomacy was switched to cooperation with the new 
government. (Kudo 2010, 270.) 
On August 5th 1988, the trade cross the Sino-Burmese border was legitimised and formalised with an 
agreement between the Myanmar Export Import Services (MEIS) and the Yunnan Province Import 
Export Corporation. Previously, border trade had been labelled informal and ad hoc. The 1988 riots 
and demonstration had however resulted in a shortage of commodities and cross-border trade was 
planned to help the shortage by importing necessary items from China. First border trade checkpoints, 
of which some were later developed into border trade zones, were established two months later and 
in 1991, Myanmar formed border trade supervision committees, and in 1996, the Department of 
Border Trade (DBT) was established. All these actions liberalised, normalised and institutionalised 
border trade. (Kudo 2010, 270–272.) Majority of official cross-border trade was on a government-to-
government basis but private firms and cooperative societies were allowed to engage in it. (Maung 
2007b, 9–10.)  
The territorialisation of the Chinese state in the borderlands after 1988 has been justified with notion 
of development and better welfare for the people. Infrastructure projects were said to have provided 
the local people with higher standards of living and better quality of life than even the people living 
in the centre of the country. State infrastructural power was strengthened at the same time with wide 
infrastructure projects, often with the help of China, Thailand or India, that improved access to 
neighbouring country markets as well as to remote areas within the country. The price of this state-
building was paid by the local population who were forcefully relocated and whose land was 
confiscated. (O’Connor 2011, 4.) The ‘Open up the West’ campaign (Xibu da kaifa), launched in 
1999, aims to help inland western provinces of PRC to catch up with the development of the coastal 
eastern provinces. It comprises of projects to attract investments to the provinces of the west as well 
as to protect the environment. The projects, that enable new forms of control by the state, are 
legitimated with rhetoric of development, but at the same time categorise certain types of people, and 
nature, as needing improvement. (Yeh 2005, 10; 12.)  
                                                            
32 Even before Burma gained its independence, the Communist Party of Burma was expelled from the AFPFL. Not long 
after, the party started transforming from a political party to an insurgent organisation whereas the Burma Socialist Party 
grew within the AFPFL and gained more supporters than CPB. (Lintner 1990, 10–11.)  
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Nonetheless, inland and border provinces have been catching up with coastal ones. These ‘late-comer’ 
provinces have adopted policies mostly in concert with those of the central government, not 
undermining or conflicting them. (Cheung & Tang 2001, 93.) Even though the 1978 reforms gave the 
provinces more autonomy, the central government still influences them strongly. (Kuah 2000, 76–
77.) Provinces are increasingly conducting foreign relations on their own, but their agendas are only 
rarely in disconcert with those of the central government. However, the competing economic interests 
and strategic considerations are gradually changing and diversifying the international behaviour of 
China. (Cheung & Tang 2001, 119–120.) No matter how strict regulations the central government 
implements, the remoteness of the provinces from Beijing makes them impossible to be effectively 
monitored by the central government (Kuah 2000, 78). The cross-border relations between Yunnan 
province and Myanmar are exactly that; relations with Yunnan, not necessarily China (Dean 2005, 
823). 
To bridge the gap between more economically integrated coastal provinces and the land-locked inland 
provinces like Yunnan, the State Council launched the Great Western Development plan (xibu da 
kaifa) in 2000 (Su 2014, 3). When the border provinces were given more autonomy by the central 
government to ease border trading, the Yunnan provincial government acted fast. It implemented 
fiscal and institutional changes, such as tax reductions and cutting down red tape, and also marketed 
the border region to attract domestic and foreign investors. An economic co-operation district was 
also established between three official border towns (Wanding, Ruili and Hekou) and Myanmar, Laos 
and Vietnam. The provincial government is free to encourage investment, give tax reductions and 
levy charges on trade conducted in the border towns. It can also decide which types of industries can 
operate in the economic zones around the border towns and how the zones function. At the macro-
level, cross-border co-operation has resulted in the creation of economic blocs, such as the Mekong 
River Economic Sub-Basin. (Kuah 2000, 79–80; 82–84.) In the 1990s there were talks of large 
regional infrastructure projects with Myanmar and the ADB to connect Yunnan and Kachin and Shan 
states as well as to create a Golden Quadrangle. (Steinberg 2001, 159–160). Yunnan has become 
China’s energy powerhouse and an important processing centre for raw material coming from Laos 
and Myanmar (Su 2014, 3; 7). 
Chinese companies and capital improved the infrastructure and raised the level of industrialization in 
Myanmar when the Western world kept the junta under sanctions. Dozens of hydropower projects 
were implemented throughout Myanmar and most of the energy produced was imported to China. 
The Chinese state-owned enterprises have also helped the junta to exploit other natural resources 
better. (Haacke 2010, 120.) Chinese development assistance has been closely linked to Chinese 
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business interests in Myanmar. For example, the Chinese government has helped Myanmar to build 
many new factories with development assistance, and cheap loans from state-owned Chinese banks, 
and in many projects of these projects, Chinese companies have been involved. The central 
government encourages Chinese businessmen to operate and invest in Myanmar. (Maung 2007b, 31–
33; 37–38). 
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6. CEASEFIRES, DRUG POLICIES, LAND CONCESSIONS, AND THE 
FUZZINESS OF TERRITORY 
Borderlands are often portrayed as distant for power (Sturgeon 2004, 466), but they are also the place 
where the territoriality of the state, the difference of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the sole authority of the 
state are negotiated. Borderlands, in the conventional sense, are spaces through which an international 
border runs. In this sense, in borderlands, a society overlaps the border. They might also be internal 
to legal state territory where there is weak state penetration due to in part difficult terrain and 
populations that resist state’s efforts to endow control and authority over them, and their labour and 
resources. Even a country can be considered a borderland if it acts as a buffer zone between two 
empires. (Brown 2012, 58.) All these aspects of borderlands are true for the Sino-Burmese 
borderlands: an international border crosses them, the terrain is difficult and people resist state control 
and state penetration, especially on the Burmese side is weak. Additionally, Myanmar can be 
considered, or at least having been, a buffer zone between China and India where the political systems 
of lowland and highland peoples are separated by “zones of mutual interest” (e.g. of policy-makers 
in China, India, Thailand in addition to ‘locals’) rather than by boundary lines (Sturgeon 2004, 264). 
All this makes the borderlands an interesting case for analysing statization, state-making, and spatial 
strategies.  
Additionally, borders and cross-border activities mark the fixed imagination of territorial state-based 
theories; thinking of mobility as crossing borders takes borders as prior to mobility. Mobile groups 
count only when “they move between the units that count”, that is, territorial nation-states. As they 
do not keep within the primary imagination of social organisation, they are deemed deviant and out 
of control. (Abraham & van Schendel 2005, 11–12.) Borderlands are a source of anxiety and 
insecurity for state elites because they can only partly be seen; physical distance is used to escape 
state control. (Abraham & van Schendel 2005, 23.) Parts of the borderlands can only be imagined by 
state actors whereas people that are part of the lived space, can manipulate and the border, border 
practices and the difficult to their advantage. At the same time, they can act as negotiating agents that 
constitute (or contest) the border. They act in multiple contexts, and use their location in the 
borderlands as a negotiation tool with state agents on either side of the border. The relations between 
the state and the borderland people can be seen as a sort of a dance, changing but inherently 
interlinked. (Sturgeon 2004, 466.) 
These cross-border movements and relations contest the territory and legitimacy of the territorial state. 
Rather than being fixed in time and space, state borders are being refigured. It is not only states that 
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control or manipulate borders, people living around them do too. In borderlands, power and profit 
can be gained from controlling the borders and the trade crossing them. The actions of local people 
can sustain or strengthen state-set borders but can also undermine or reconfigure them.  Defiance to 
state control is manifested by unauthorized cross-border movements and trading, smuggling or aiding 
of illegal immigrants. (Oh 2013, 1; 4.) Not every cross-border action is about defying or contesting 
the border. If Kachin villagers continue their century-old tradition of rotating five-day market system 
and go buy vegetables from the Chinese side of the international Sino-Burmese border, they are 
following their practices in their lived space. However, the Chinese border official is part of state 
territorialisation at the border; the control of people crossing is done to establish territorial state order, 
and its limits. (Dean 2005, 812–813.)  
In the cases I present, conventional IR can see the security of China concerns concerning the border 
regions of Myanmar and the Yunnan province. It can analyse the geopolitical interests of Beijing in 
Myanmar as presented themselves as concerns for energy security and power plant construction. It 
can see ethnic strife in several northern states as internal unrest and potential for war, but not as much 
more. The cross-border drugs trade, including related smuggling and criminal activities, could be 
analysed as a phenomenon of globalisation, although it has taken place in the area for centuries. It 
could also analyse the Chinese investments in Myanmar, such as energy and infrastructure projects, 
mining ventures and agricultural land concessions as compromising the sovereignty of Myanmar. 
While all valid notions, and most likely also true, my approach reveals how these phenomena, the 
material reality they happen in, and the responses, strategies and everyday practices come to sing the 
state to existence, not the other way around. 
 
6.1. Ceasefires as state territorial strategies 
Myanmar has been in a state of civil war for practically all its years as an independent country. When 
the country gained independence, the central state claimed territorial sovereignty upon the whole 
terrain within its newly established international borders. This includes states that used to be under 
the governance of their own spatially organised political authorities, like the ones that are now known 
as the Kachin and Shan states. Colonial rule had never been effectively established in these spaces. 
In the Panglong conference in 1947, the Kachin and Shan elites agreed to rights of states. Amongst 
the states with more rights than some others, the Kachin and Shan elites seemed to be satisfied with 
the constitutional arrangements that empowered state councils to make laws and raise taxes. The Shan 
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state was also given the right to secession after ten years. However, dissatisfaction amongst the 
population of the two states soon grew due to many things, such as failure of the government to 
provide economic assistance to them, concessions of three Kachin villages to China, and the 
promotion of Buddhism (Kachins are for the most part Christians). Soon after independence in 1948, 
the country was stridden with civil war as ethnic groups took up to arms. (Thawnghmung 2011, 5–6.)  
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) was founded in 1961. KIO has its own army called Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 6). The Kachin state was 
effectively controlled by KIO from the 1960s up until a ceasefire with the ruling junta in 1994 
(International Rivers 2011). There are other armed groups in Kachin state as well, such as the New 
Democratic Army-Kachin, Kachin Defence Army and Lasang Awng Wa Peace Group, who all signed 
ceasefires with the junta in the early 1990s. Unlike KIO that has refused to disarm itself, these groups 
have been transformed to state-authorised border guard forces or people’s militia. (Thawnghmung 
2011, 14–15.) In June 2011, the ceasefires were broken as conflict resumed in both Kachin and Shan 
states (Kramer & Woods 2012, 7). Initial peace agreements have been signed with various groups, 
but no new ceasefire agreements have been signed and the fighting continues to this day. It remains 
unclear whether the future elections in 2015 will further or pull back the process towards peace. (The 
Economist 2015.)    
During the socialist regime, the government’s response to ethnic ‘insurgency’ was a military one; the 
army attempted to disarm the opposing armed groups. Their stand was highly uncompromising, and 
nothing less but the complete elimination of the armed groups was deemed acceptable. The raging 
civil war and the ‘Communist threat’ were used to legitimate the military rule. State territorialisation 
was based almost solely on brute force and military tactics. (Lintner 1990, 2.) Even though the 
military managed to take control in many areas from the ‘resistance’, large areas continued to be 
controlled by various armed groups (Thawnghmung 2011, 6–8). Several groups built their own de 
facto states that were both politically and territorially extensive. In a way, the Burmese state was in 
war against other states, albeit the others were not internationally accepted as such. Many tactics were 
adopted from the British, such as ‘scorched earth’. (Brown 2012, 118.)  Additionally, people who 
belonged to an ethnic minority but lived in a government-controlled area were successfully separated 
from people of the same origin living in areas controlled by the armed groups; they preferred living 
quietly and safely to vocalising their support to the ‘resistance’ and their nationalist sentiments. 
(Thawnghmung 2011, 6–8.) The Tatmadaw, the Burma Army, has had to deal with armed ethnic 
groups ever since the country gained independence. One strategy has remained throughout the 
different regimes, and times of conflict and cease-fires; ethnic strongmen, selected by the Tatmadaw, 
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are contracted to help fight the armed groups. In exchange, these strongmen are allowed to use their 
“territories of influence” for opium production and even tax it, as well as to use government-
controlled roads and town for trafficking it. Over the years, these Tatmadaw-backed businessmen 
have expanded their businesses into the licit economic sector as well, mostly to agribusiness. (Woods 
2013, 7.) 
With the military take-over in 1989 in the newly-named Myanmar, ceasefires were signed throughout 
the country which made it possible for the junta to liberalise border trade and invite Chinese 
investments to the country. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 4.) The sanctions imposed by the Western countries 
pushed many political leaders towards increased reliance on natural resources and dependency on the 
Chinese private sector as one of the only few options for revenue. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 38.) The 
ceasefires with armed groups enabled the junta to extend its territorial reach and assert its authority 
over its peripheral regions. At the same it took a turn from socialist regime towards a market-oriented 
economy. The economic control of the resource-rich ethnic areas was a state-territorialisation strategy. 
(O’Connor 2011, 3–4.) In Kachin state, after the ceasefire, KIO maintained its military infrastructure 
and administrative role in some areas of the state. However, all natural resources were claimed as 
official property of the state. (Kachin Development Networking Group, 8.) The same happened in the 
Shan state that used to be the base of the CPB. After CPB disintegrated, cease-fire agreement were 
signed between the junta and former CPB groups. The ethnic groups were allowed to keep their armed 
forces and continue with the drug trade in exchange for not fighting the state troops. In nine years, 
the opium production more than doubled. (Chin & Zhang 2007, 7–8.) 
The military takeover of the country changed state territorialisation practices. After the military 
takeover in 1989, the junta started accommodating the armed groups to the state apparatus through 
military-economic agreements. (Brown 2012, 111.) During the first half of the 1990s, the Tatamdaw 
made ceasefire agreements with most of the armed groups in the country, including the Kachin 
Independence Organisation (KIO) and the Shan State Army (SSA). Most groups were able to 
maintain some territory, access to arms, and were given business opportunities, and additionally they 
were enabled to have contact with the ethnic minorities living in state-controlled areas. The ceasefires 
allowed the SLORC/SPDC focus their military efforts against the remaining fighting groups. SPDC 
transformed some of the ceasefire groups to border guard forces and people’s militias, technically 
under the control of Burmese army. (Thawnghmung 2011, 9–10.) 
Instead of trying to squash military opposition, except for those unwilling to disarm, the control of 
land, and natural and human resources, legitimacy building through promised peace and development, 
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became the primary territorialisation strategies. (Brown 2012, 111–112; 118.) As ethnic political 
leaders exchanged in effect the control of their territory to the state army for joint resource 
concessions, they turned to more businessmen than political leaders (Woods 2010, 4). This state-
making and territorialisation strategy has proven much more effective than its predecessor, although 
the governance established through cooperating ceasefire groups limits the state’s ability to enforce 
policies. For example, most major border gates are under ceasefire group control which hindrances 
border trade (Kudo 2010, 282). The ceasefires, while bearing many benefits, such as freer movement 
and less violence, led to “greater military presence, intense exploitation of natural resources, and 
development initiated displacement”. (Thawnghmung 2011, 18.) The KIO/KIA practices of 
territoriality have presently been forcefully contained to limited areas that have shrunk due to the 
larger, stronger and better-equipped Burmese army (Dean 2005, 820–821.) 
The junta’s strategy to incorporate ceasefire groups to the state included their transformation to border 
guard forces under the control of the Tatmadaw. In Kachin state, the number of state troops increased 
from 26 battalions in 1994 to 41 in 2006. At the same time, confiscations of land and buildings 
increased. They were used for military purposes or sold to outside business actors for a profit. Left 
landless, local people have had to relocate to other areas. (Kachin Development Networking Group 
2007, 1; 9.) Only smaller groups, like the MNDAA and NDA-K, agreed whereas the largest groups, 
like KIO and UWSA, rejected. As a response, the government cut communication with the groups, 
withdrew doctors and teachers from the areas, and did not hold elections in areas under the groups’ 
control. In 2011, conflict flared again. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 16.) Many armed groups based in 
Shan state signed ceasefire agreements with the government in the 1990s and some formed political 
parties. United Wa State Army, SSA-North and SSA-South have refused to disarm and SSA-South 
continues to fight a guerrilla war against state forces. (Thawnghmung 2011, 16.)  
The border between areas under the control of the state and the areas controlled by KIO/A is more 
controlled an explicit than the border between Chinese territory and the KIO/A controlled areas. For 
example territory is marked more often and more clearly with gates, guards and flags in the borders 
of state/KIO/A than in the China/KIO/A borders. In essence, the border between territories controlled 
by KIO/A and the Burmese government mark an international border; “the crossings display hoisted 
flags of both governments, armed guards in respective uniforms, and gates/checkpoints where 
identification is checked and often tax on goods charged”. (Dean 2005, 820–821.) This reflects the 
Burmese state’s goal of establishing absolute territorial rule; flexible and overlapping territorialities 
(or any other form of alternative spatial organisation of political authorities) are not tolerated if they 
can be avoided. At the same time it reflects the nationalist wishes of the Kachin of international 
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recognition as a nation of their own; the borders with the state that claims territorial authority over 
them are maintained with traditional military and border control practices. 
The sociospatial organisation across the Sino-Burmese border, where border control practices would 
be expected from the traditional view of the territorial state, is a completely different story. KIO/A’s 
political authority is organised on the other hand based on territoriality against the Burmese state 
territory, but at the same time, it is based on the traditional spatial organisation of the Kachin; 
spatiality based on flows. In their everyday lives, the Kachin cross the orders for trade, for marriages, 
and many other imaginable function of everyday life. Also KIO/A officers commute through China 
in cars under Chinese plates with military escorts, make formal visits, and official agreements on 
trade and on the handing over of prisoners, and even celebrate the founding date of the KIO with 
Chinese local-, prefecture- and provincial-level officials. The Chinese spatial organisation of political 
authority is more flexible than that of the Burmese state; it allows for mutually adaptable and co-
existing spatialities. By granting de facto autonomy to the KIO/A, it can more easily on the other 
hand govern what goes on the Kachin territory, like opium cultivation (this is further discussed in the 
next section). (Dean 2005b, 820–821; 825.) 
The flexibility of space between Chinese and KIO/A authorities allows the Kachin people to gain 
better living standards on the other side of the international border. The Chinese villages by the Sino-
Burmese border have developed faster than their Burmese counterparts. The roads are in better 
condition, and services like communications and health clinics, and goods are more readily available 
on the Chinese side. The people living by the border cross it regularly, and it has been made easy by 
the Chinese officials. In practice, to the borderland-Burmese, “China has become the provider of 
almost everything – from vegetables to consumer products, from technology to manpower for 
construction and maintenance, as well as for the electricity and phone lines, including mobile network 
(that can be used on the Kachin side near the border) and internet access”. (Dean 2005, 824.) In 
practice, then, the people residing on the other side of the border are brought under the governance 
of China in addition to that of KIO/A and the Burmese state. In their everyday practices, people are 
able to take advantage of the co-existence of political authorities by moving in space.  
In the Shan state as well the local ethnic group leaders not only have ethnic, but also professional and 
personal relations across the border with Yunnan authorities. The Chinese side knows the ethnic 
groups are willing to engage in trade to benefit both sides of the border, legal or illicit. With a weak 
central government Chinese commercial activities in the borderlands cannot be as easily monitored. 
It seems that Chinese actors support the leaders that are de facto in control. SOEs have been suspected 
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of selling weapons ultimately ending up with ethnic armies, and some technical and military 
advisement has allegedly also been given to the ethnic groups. However, the PRC cannot support 
ethnic armed groups even if they are ethnic Chinese without invoking old memories of an aggressive 
Chinese regime in the region. (Haacke 2010, 126–128; 132.)  
Kevin Woods (2011) calls the process of state-building by creating military–private partnerships to 
gain authority over landscapes that have previously escaped state control ceasefire capitalism. In 
ceasefire capitalism, businessmen and local elites together create landscapes that can be controlled 
by the state/military apparatus out of spaces outside of state de facto governance. In Myanmar, in 
ceasefire agreements with ethnic insurgence/paramilitary groups customary land rights were 
substituted with concessions to private parties. Property rights were established and shifted from the 
local people customarily inhabiting and cultivating the land to private actors from e.g. China. Finance, 
landscape production, governance and state formation co-emerged in space and time and established 
increased military–state control over space. The privatization of selected state functions made spaces 
formerly neglected landscapes secure, or legible, enabling the state or the military to govern them. 
The privatization also intensified the importance of territoriality as leaders ‘lost’ part of their 
sovereign power. (Woods 2011, 751–752.)   
 
6.2. Cross-border drug policies: Bringing the state in through private sector 
The extent drug trade and cultivation in Myanmar has been made possible by the interrelations of 
‘public’ and ‘private’ in Burma/Myanmar. Government has relied on private businesses and business 
people to fund the state machine even if the official state policy has been a socialist one. Parties and 
party officials have relied on financial support from business to take care of monthly expenses. For 
example, during the years leading to independence, business people were a way to access workers 
and peasants over whom they had influence; they were able to buy votes and order their workers to 
vote a certain way. During the Burmese Way to Socialism, only people engaging in economic 
activities, legal or illegal, had the resources to fund government officials and committees or even 
public goods. Therefore, despite the official socialist policies, local officials needed to preserve 
(illegal) business practices. (Kyaw 2002, 79–82; 85–88.) After China started opening up, Chinese 
officials did not separate between illegal and legal trade either. In the 1980s, black market trade 
between China and Burma thrived and most of it was controlled by KIO or the CPB that funded their 
activities with the revenues. (Dean 2005, 818.) 
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During the socialist regime (1962–1988), cross-border trade was officially illegal in Burma. However, 
the government controlled somewhat 60 kilometres of the 2,200-kilometre border and the ban had 
merely official-legal significance. (Dean 2005, 815.) At the same time, businesses did rely on their 
good relations with state officials to gain access to government-controlled resources and, during the 
socialist period, to even be able to operate. Tax evasion and smuggling has been made possible (only) 
by having powerful officials to protect33 the business. In the 1980s, anti-smuggling legislation worked 
in the favour of influential smugglers; it helped them create a monopoly. These businessmen were 
tipped off before major raids and were able to escape them. Instead, the anti-smuggling campaigns 
served to eliminate competition as the products of those who did not have strong enough ties to the 
government were confiscated in them. The shortage of the products also multiplied their prices. Most 
legal businesses could not afford as good relations as the illegal businesses because they were not 
able to reap equal profits. Those who could, were mostly large capitalist companies. (Kyaw 2002, 
88–91.) 
Until 1987, clientelistic networks between government and business people helped create a social and 
political equilibrium in the country (although compared internationally, Myanmar deteriorated to the 
list of the least developed countries). (Il)legal businesses helped provide jobs and meet people’s 
economic needs and financed government activities. Burma’s three largest notes were demonetised 
in 1987, but the people could not exchange the old notes to currency of legal tender. As a result, 
people could only afford basic food items. Trade declined drastically as consumer demand withered 
away. Additionally, as businesses were no longer able to contribute to political and religious events, 
people that had worked to organise them, such as performers and carpenters, experienced economic 
hardship as well. The old equilibrium of public and private networks crumbled and with it collapsed 
social and political stability. The socialist government was blames for taking away the people’s 
money, and riots and uprisings became commonplace all over the country. (Kyaw 2002, 87–88.) The 
state’s sovereignty had been built on fluid networks of people and favours both from the public and 
private sectors. As the private got weaker, so did the public.  
The Tatmadaw legitimated its power with various activities of state development and nationalist 
agenda: new schools were built, Buddhist activities were supported and grand sports festivals were 
held. However, the new regime did not have the funds for them. Instead, in 1988–1998, a very small 
                                                            
33 Having friends in high places enabled people engaged in illegal business practices to be left untouched by the police 
and customs officers. If an officer made the mistake of extorting money from a friend of an influential party cadre, he 
was often transferred to a remote area. (Kyaw 2002, 89.) Power was exercised in a spatial manner; a state official’s power 
and social status was dependent on where he was physically located. The further from the centre of political power, the 
less power he had.  
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segment of the population, mostly business people, contributed approximately 80 per cent of the funds 
needed to bankroll of the legitimating activities. Although the junta promoted market economy 
reforms, the power relations between illegal and legal traders, and big and small companies stayed 
pretty much the same as during the socialist period; those with power could get away with almost 
anything, although not always if their activities were illegal, and the fates of small- and medium-sized 
business’ owners was dependent on the police and customs officials and whether the businessmen 
would afford even a small bribe or not. (Kyaw 2002, 93–94; 98–99.) 
As cross-border trade, people’s movements across borders and the consumer economy grew in the 
1990s and 2000s, so did ‘illegal’34 trade. Especially drugs, such as opium, heroin and amphetamines, 
have re-emerged and with them, prostitution. As a result, the number of new HIV/AIDS infections 
has skyrocketed. (Sturgeon et al. 2013, 63.) The main opium-producing states in Myanmar used to be 
the Kokang and Wa states, but in the mid-2000s the production moved to the Shan and Kachin state 
because of opium bans in the Kokang and Wa states. In these states, all the parties involved in the 
ethnic conflict in Myanmar participate in the drug trade. The cultivation is also a way for poor farmers 
to make ends meet when their crops are not enough to feed their families. Opium is also widely used 
for ceremonial and medicinal activities. (Transnational Institute 2010, 2.) Earlier most of the heroin 
had been shipped to Hong Kong but the opening up of trade on land, the trade flows concentrated in 
Yunnan. (Chin & Zhang 2007, 8.) The Chinese and Burmese authorities have increasingly controlled 
the borders and retaliated against major drug traffickers in the 1990s and 2000s, but increasing 
amounts of drugs cross the porous border. Increasingly the smugglers are peasant acting as mules. 
(Chin & Zhang 2007, 11.) Cross-border movement happens also for other drug-related reasons; 
Chinese drug users are known even to go to Myanmar to kick their habit because the punishment are 
stricter on the Burmese side (Weng 2006, 199).  
HIV/AIDS spread to China from outside its borders and initially spread in specific parts of Yunnan 
province. The prefecture of Dehong next to Eastern Myanmar border is the most drugs and HIV 
affected area in China. (Weng 2006, 196; 199–200.) For example this spread of the disease has made 
the use of injected drugs is a growing security concern in China. Rather than addressing the social 
problems leading to the use of drugs, the Chinese state has launched programs in Myanmar and Laos 
to counter the threat. A major part of opium and heroin and some of the amphetamine-type stimulants 
available in the Chinese market originate from Myanmar. The drugs enter mostly through the Yunnan 
province, located next to Myanmar, and has also acted as a gateway of drug abuse to the rest of China. 
                                                            
34 See Abraham & van Schendel (2005) for a study on the arbitrariness of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ as part of the making of the 
state. 
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(Transnational Institute 2010, 1; 3.) Chinese village heads have utilized the border to their advantage, 
and constituted the border as side-product. On the one hand, they serve state interests and expansion 
of its authority by controlling local resource access. This gives them higher status, and they take 
advantage of state approval and economic support it provides in the name of development. On the 
other hand, they do also utilize their connections and loyalties on the other side of the border for, 
among other things, transferring illicit goods across borders. (Sturgeon 2004, 466.) 
The government policies and practices towards drug trade in Myanmar have varied over time. In the 
late 1980s, the drug trade in Kachin state flourished and resulted in a lot of deaths. As the government 
was not concerned, KIO launched a campaign that curbed the trade for a while. However, after the 
ceasefire in 1994, poppy cultivation resumed. Those connected with the government officials were 
allowed to trade drugs. (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 39; 43–46.) Opium 
cultivation declined in Myanmar in 1997–2006 because of opium bans in key cultivating areas in 
Shan state and anti-drugs campaigns in the Kachin and Shan states. The effective bans were enforced 
by the ceasefire groups, such as National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Myanmar National 
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Shan state and KIO 
and New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K) in Kachin state in the wish of gaining international 
recognition and support. In 1999 the government also announced a 15-year opium cultivation 
elimination plan. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 13.) The bans always have only a limited effect because 
ceasefire groups, Chinese businessmen, Burmese drug lords, Tatmadaw units, government officials 
on all sides of the border as well as ordinary people participate in the drug trade along the Sino-
Burmese border. Due to on-going instability and conflict in the Kachin and Shan states, illegal trade 
and opium cultivation are almost the only ways to make a living and fund (insurgency) activities. 
Chinese businessmen fund the activities of the Burmese drug traders and their expansion. Most drug 
traffickers are ‘normal’ risk takers like in any other business, not professional criminals. The 
trafficking is even taxed by all armed groups as well as the state government. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 
14–15.) 
Already in 1997–2006, the ceasefire groups as well as the junta were pressured by Chinese actors to 
eradicate poppy cultivation. Since 2006, the bans enforced by the cease-fire groups have been backed 
by Chinese opium substitution programmes, like the Opium Replacement Fund of the Yunnan 
province, promoting mono-plantations of alternative cash crops, like rubber35. However, from 2006 
                                                            
35 This alternative rationale for the programmes designed to inhibit drug trade is the great demand for rubber in China 
where available, suitable, and arable land is in limited supply. Additionally, the concessions provide cover for illegal 
logging. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 3.) This side of the schemes is discussed in the next section. 
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onwards, the cultivation has been on the rise again as impoverished people are looking for means to 
support themselves. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 2–3; 13.) In 2000s, the business has still continued and 
government authorities are involved in it, at least through by allowing it by accepting bribes, although 
there has been anti-drug campaign launched by the SPCD and ceasefire groups. The campaigns have 
not worked because the government officials have allowed the local militia and ceasefire groups to 
continue producing drugs in exchange for cooperating with the state. Only poppy cultivations of those 
who could not pay bribes were destroyed. (Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 39; 43–
46.) 
To combat problems and security concerns associated with substance abuse and poppy cultivation, 
the Chinese government, both on the national and regional Yunnan level, has implemented schemes 
to “fight the war” against drugs and AIDS. The anti-drug schemes aim to develop the border regions’ 
economies by integrating them into the regional market establishing relations across the border 
between authorities and businessmen. In the programs Chinese companies’ investment to the poppy-
cultivating areas are promoted. The schemes are promoted as an alternative source of income by 
converting poppy fields to plantations of other cash crops, such as rubber, sugarcane, tea or corn. 
(Transnational Institute 2010, 1; 3.) Chinese companies are encouraged to participate in the schemes 
by financial incentives such as relaxation of labor regulations, tax and VAT waivers and permission 
to import the produced crops to China. The plantations made under the schemes have to meet several 
conditions, such as contributing to socio-economic development. The problem is that most plantations 
are mono-plantations, mostly rubber, and that some companies do not actually cultivate anything at 
all but just buy crops and import them under the scheme, making substantive profits. (Transnational 
Institute 2010, 4.) The benefits of shifting opium cultivation to rubber thought the Chinese 
programmes are reaped for the most part Chinese businessmen and local authorities, not the farmers 
themselves; land concessions are agreed upon between the Chinese and the Burmese authorities, and 
local people are excluded. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 3.) 
Most opium in Myanmar is cultivated in isolated mountainous areas. It has many benefits compared 
to many other crops; it has high value compared to its weight which makes it easier to transport and 
traders are also willing to travel to remote villages to buy it and even give credit based on the sale of 
future crops. Opium cultivation enables the villagers to stay in the remote areas and even develop 
some education and health facilities there. (Kramer & Woods 2012, 14.) The Chinese investments 
made under the substitution program however are usually made in lowland areas where poppy is not 
actually cultivated that much. Closely related to programs trying to end the cultivation, the local 
authorities have resettled up-land communities to lower valleys. (Transnational Institute 2010, 4.) 
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Same kind of processes based on perceived remoteness, lack of connectivity and the resulting poverty 
have also been used as rationalizations of development cooperation interventions that have shifted 
cultivation and/or entire upland populations from the uplands to the lowlands. (Lagerqvist 2013, 57.) 
 
6.3. Land concessions modify lived space to abstract space 
After the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the socialist regime started moulding China into a social nation 
state. One of the strategies to secure frontier areas into the national territory was to classify frontier 
peoples to ‘minority nationalities’ that were ranked according to their ‘social development’, based on 
the modes of production. This linked minorities with land uses. For example in the Xishuangbanna 
Dai prefecture, one of the thirteen prefectures in Yunnan province, the state was territorialised by 
reorganising agricultural production into communes and rubber farms. In the lowlands, state control 
was effectively established by the end of the 1950s whereas in the highlands farmers continued on 
with their shifting cultivation until the 1970s. The transformation of the society and nature was 
legitimated by the national socialist ideology and backed up by the threat of force. (Sturgeon et al. 
2013, 59–60.) 
The communes were dismantled in the 1980s as part of the opening up strategy of the country. 
Commune lands and forests were divided and contracted anew; society and nature were once again 
transformed though imagining them in cartographic space and then applying the changes in physicals 
pace, this time legitimated by national economic development. With farming campaigns and new 
property rights rubber cultivation was shifted in increasing numbers from state land to household land. 
At the same time, shifting cultivation was shamed in the name of environmentalism and the highland 
people pictured as backward forest destroyers, who held back the economic growth of the country, to 
legitimate the establishment of nature reserves on their forests. As a result, the highlanders lost a lot 
of land which led to increasing poverty. (Sturgeon et al. 2013, 60–61; 63.) In the late 1990s, the 
central government made the most significant changes to forest and land resource tenure rights since 
the early 1980s; the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP) and the Sloping Land Conversion 
Program (SLCP) that superseded many previous tenure agreements.  
The rationale behind the programs was disastrous flooding along the Yangtze River in late 1990s and 
the concern for natural forests it raised. Additionally, the purpose of the NFPP was to restructure the 
forestry industry that had faced financial crises due to declining timber volumes. The logging ban on 
natural forests, part of the NFPP, concentrates on transforming logging-associated livelihoods and 
76 
 
enterprises towards more sustainable forest management ones. One of the goals is to increase natural 
forests in China, but the program has had reverse effects in the neighbouring countries where timber 
imports have increased substantially since 1988. Large forest areas have been logged and the timber 
transported to China in Myanmar. The SLCP can be seen as continuance to the 1980s shaming of 
shifting cultivation and the related relabeling of land and forest. Its goal is to convert arable land of 
the hillsides to forest and/or grassland. The legitimation for the program is on the one hand 
environmentalism and on the other, poverty alleviation. The assumption is that as the arable land of 
the hillside people can no longer used for farming, more labour will be available for other forms of 
employment. (Weyerhaeuser et al. 2005, 238–240.) Like the environmentalist programs of the 1980s, 
the SLCP in effect territorialises state space and increases the infrastructural power the state is able 
to wield. The state becomes present in the lives and social relations of the people who are told to what 
to do with their land, or forced to relocate to lower lands to find employment elsewhere, in a space 
that has already been territorialised by the state. 
In Myanmar, all land is officially owned by the state. Land that has not been officially registered with 
the governments, is considered wasteland that can be confiscated from peasants farming it and then 
sold as a concession to a company. The lands that are not registered are usually used for swidden 
cultivation in the highlands where instead of formalized land ownership contracts, land use has 
traditionally been controlled in customary ways, based on customary rights. It is quite common that 
land is (unofficially) sold and transferred from one person to another by these customary rights even 
though the state claims ownership over them. The result is that land is claimed by multiple actors in 
rhetoric and in practice; various political authorities in addition to cease-fire groups and the Burmese 
state/military; also warlords and Chinese businessmen have their share of power. The reinforcement 
of state institutions undermines the customary, weak institutions and in effect also the customary 
rights to land. The agricultural sector in Myanmar has been increasingly privatized in Myanmar since 
the junta started reforming the country’s economic policies from socialist to capitalist ones, and the 
cease-fire agreements gave the state access to former conflict zones. In the 1990s and 2000s, 
approximately 1.5 million acres of land was leased to 200 agribusiness companies by the government. 
(Woods 2010, 4–8; 13–14; Woods 2011, 754–755.) In the Burmese government’s 30-year Master 
Plan for the Agriculture Sector, the goal is to convert 10 million acres of ‘wasteland’ for private 
industrial agricultural promotion by 2030. (Global Witness 2014, 5). 
The logging bans create incentives for Chinese logging companies to search business outside of 
China’s territorial borders, for example from Myanmar. The enterprises can get the logging 
concessions from either the government or the ethnic groups controlling the forests who finance their 
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operations mostly with illegal trade and smuggling. The involvement of Chinese logging companies 
in Myanmar is by all measures pervasive; in addition to logging and importing, Chinese companies 
build infrastructure needed for their activities, and use Chinese equipment, workers36 and basic 
supplies. Most of the Chinese logging in Myanmar is done by small companies operating there 
without legal licenses to do so. This is possible thanks to a lack of regulation and enforcement of the 
border. Individual power based on status and relations tends to trump institutional power; institutions 
can exercise only limited control over natural resources unless they are backed by individuals with a 
lot of individual power. They cooperate with the few large companies with the needed paperwork 
who also take care of investing for infrastructure and dealing with officials. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 19; 
34.) Logging companies need to constantly build new roads to northern Myanmar to be able to operate 
there. Especially in the farthest north, the terrain is rugged that makes high-grade roads expensive to 
build. Additionally, extreme weather and landslides frequently destroy bridges and roads. They have 
also made “roads for resources” deals, where the companies agree to build roads and bridges in 
exchange for a certain amounts of timber concessions. However, the built infrastructure has for the 
most part been scattered and disconnected in a way that only serves the companies’ needs but not 
those of the people living in the area. (Kahrl et al. 2004, 21; 27.)  
Rubber cultivation makes a lucrative crop alternative as the world consumption of rubber has 
increased at an average rate of 5.8 rate for in the last century. The world market price has come down 
since the world economic crisis, but rubber cultivation is still highly profitable. (Fox & Castella 2013, 
158.) In the lowlands of Yunnan, farmers started planting rubber trees in their household lands. After 
China entered the WTO in 2001, the price of Chinese rubber was set by the world markets. The 
international price for rubber skyrocketed in 2003 and made lowland farmers richer than would have 
been able to even imagine before. (Sturgeon et al. 2013, 62.) On the other hand, it made local 
authorities and state farmers unsettled, lowland farmers dependent on the price of rubber (ibid.), but 
also made farmers on other sides of state borders pursue the Chinese dream that they witnessed in the 
sudden rise in the standard of living across the border (Dianna 2007, 1–2). However, in areas where 
rubber has not traditionally been cultivated, the plantations are joint projects between Myanmar 
military regional officials and Chinese companies, with Myanmar companies acting as cover so that 
the Chinese company that in reality owns the plantations37 can avoid paying tax. In some cases, the 
ethnic armed groups have established plantations by either paying farmers or forcibly relocating them 
                                                            
36 In 2003, a Chinese government official estimated that for example in Baoshan’s Tengchong County, more than half of 
the population had been involved in logging in Myanmar! (Kahrl et al. 2004, 19.) 
37 In traditional rubber plantations, 90.5 per cent of rubber holders are small holders. (Fox & Castella 2013, 165–166.) 
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to the plantations. (Fox & Castella 2013, 165–166.) The majority of rubber produced in Myanmar is 
exported to China. (Global Witness 2014, 3.) 
Private companies and land concessions given to them are used to meet government quotas for 
agricultural production. Whereas traditionally rubber has been cultivated by small family farms in the 
southern parts of Myanmar, new large-scale plantations are set up in Kachin and Shan states. The 
plantations are set up in the traditional taungya fields, defined by the state as ‘wastelands’, where 
local farmers farm their crops by using swidden cultivation. (Global Witness 2014, 3.) “Kachin State 
and northern Shan State have received the highest rate of increase in concessions in the country, 
which is from the significant increase in Chinese agribusiness deals supported by China’s opium 
substitution program in northern Burma” (Woods 2013, 10; 15). Rubber concessions under the 
Chinese opium substitution programmes have mostly been made between the government of 
Myanmar and Chinese actors, but also the local non-state military authorities, such as army 
commanders, ceasefire groups and local pro-government militias, have made contracts with Chinese 
businessmen concerning the areas under their control. (Transnational Institute 2010, 7.) 
Rubber production under the opium substitution program has actually been strongly supported in 
Shan and Kachin states by these local/regional actors. Most of the funding for the concessions 
originates from businesses based in Yunnan or Kunming, sometimes also Hainan or other provinces. 
The form of the contracts is usually a joint venture, at least in government-controlled areas. 
(Transnational Institute 2010, 7.) Burman businessmen lack the needed patron-client relationships 
with the ethnic groups and therefore have limited opportunities to invest there. Most agribusiness 
deals are carried through local businessmen, who are often of Chinese origin, with mainland Chinese 
investors. However, as the state gains strength in the ethnic spaces, the Burman companies receive 
more and more land concessions for agribusiness. (Woods 2013, 10.) 
In Kachin state, one way of contesting and challenging the large land concessions to private 
companies has been the establishment of community forests. Under the scheme, villages form 
community forest user groups that establish community forests, led by an elected villager, in their 
former upland swidden fields. However, the community forests are based on land management plans 
that separate land used for forest and agriculture; the distinction is similar to state land classification, 
not traditional land management of the villages. Although these community forests enable the villages 
to have more say in the management of their land, and represent a bottom-up resistance against land 
dispossessions caused by land concessions to private companies, they and up fortifying the 
territorialisation of state power in village lands. They create a collective property regime according 
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to state laws and categories, not based on customary rights, and additionally change the traditional 
farming based on a mosaic of trees and swidden fields to forest land of state-desired trees, creating 
similar dispossession as the rubber plantations the CFs are used to prevent. (Woods 2010, 1–2; 14–
15.) 
Land concessions create new forms of policed property. They offer a revenue stream and power 
leverage to the governing regime. They also re-distribute power. When a resource or land is granted 
to an actor, the political territory is re-configured. It not only creates an owner of the resource/land, 
but also shuts off others who might have used it. This can be a local farmer banned from the land he 
has traditionally cultivated or an armed organization that used to feed its troops from the crops grown 
in it. As such, concessions to private actors can provide the state with a territorializing mechanism. 
Thus, assigning some functions of state and some control of resources/land to private actors, state 
building has not been disabled but quite the opposite. The concessions have given the state institutions 
a point of entry to spaces formerly controlled e.g. by armed groups or local elites. Governing of a 
resource is not merely about controlling the mining of jade or the logging of timber. For example in 
Myanmar, the shift of governance of jade mines from an armed group to the state was not only about 
the redirecting revenues. It also had to do with taking away sources of resources and undermining the 
influence of the insurgents and their ability for political control. Over time, authority moves from 
non-state institutions to state-controlled ones and enables more and more state control. Additionally, 
this has redefined the relationship between forest and agricultural land by separating them from each 
other when they traditionally have been managed together. Farmers are also forced to resettle in 
villages after losing their rights to their lands. (Woods 2011, 752; 754–755.)  
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7. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to approach the central issue of International Relations, the state, in a 
new way. I have always felt some uneasiness about the centrality of the state, but have come to realise 
through this work that it is not the state I am uncomfortable with, but rather the absolute manner in 
which it is imagined in the discipline. Reimagining such a central concept, especially one that is 
present in my everyday life, was not easy or comfortable. I set out find answers from various 
disciplines from political geography, still somewhat close to International Relations, all the way to 
agricultural studies. Once I even found myself contemplating on the premises of modern physics and 
the four-dimensionality of time–space. I believe that the end result, a conceptualisation of the state as 
a spatial political authority created in everyday practices, offers good additional insight to the working 
of international relations. 
The cases showed how the more spatiotemporally reflexive concepts open up new kinds of avenues 
for research. They allow for a better understanding of change, and also the presence of history in our 
everyday lives. For example the lives of the Kachin people embody all at the same time age-old 
sociospatial imageries based on kinship and mobility. They continue on with their daily lives like 
their ancestors have done before them, despite of an international border that in turn is an artefact of 
the colonial period and ideals of modern statehood. At the same time they have embraced the same 
ideals behind that border; nationalism and sovereignty in their claims of a nation, and the right to a 
state of their own. KIO acts as a similar political authority as a state, establishing a border against 
what is dangerous outside of that border; Burmans and the Myanmar army.  
What is importantly highlighted in the cases is that all social and/or spatial strategies are restricted by 
physical space, like the mountains and jungles of the borderlands hinder state territorialisation in 
Kachin and Shan states, and it can also be manipulated or used to the advantage of the actor, like 
when highland people’s swidden cultivation is shamed as environmentally hostile and people are then 
forced to migrate to lower lands to cultivate rubber or find some other employment. This brings them 
closer to territorial power and more easily reached by state actors. This is something the mainstream 
IR approaches are not able to analyse, due to their uneasiness with physical space. 
Another important factor in the cases are the intermeshed relationships of various actors of different 
origins, occupations, and motivations. What constitutes the state cannot be deduced to those officially 
identified with the state. Instead, both intentionally and not, others can also carry in the state and its 
policies, even NGOs trying to oppose state strategies. This is something to keep in mind in future IR 
research even if otherwise taking a different route to mine; research will leave a considerable amount 
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of blind spots if what is political, or even what is state-related, is assumed a priori to empirical analysis. 
Accepting this does make conducting research possibly more difficult, or at least more cumbersome, 
but I find it essential especially for research that hopes to have practical policy effects or that seeks 
to be emancipatory. The major challenge for this kind of research is that the researcher has to be 
willing to deal with multiple, changing and heterogeneous truths. The unit of the study does not stay 
put.  
The ethnographic method was not easily brought to International Relations. I was lucky enough to 
find plenty of material from fieldwork studies, but realise that if the research was to be taken to the 
next level, it would require fieldwork also by the other herself. Now, I relied on maps and textual 
descriptions of what sociospatial relations look and feel like in the borderlands of China and Myanmar. 
The analysis could be made better if the researcher herself would also travel to the spaces and 
everyday realities she is trying to understand. For the purposes of the case studies presented in this 
thesis, the reliance on already written material was sufficient in my view as their function was to 
showcase how the concepts could be used in further research. And they did just that; they 
demonstrated that the approach suggested in this thesis can provide alternative, fruitful avenues for 
International Relations research to explore in questions of state power and sovereignty. Static 
absolutes do make nice grand theories, but they are rather estranged from the fuzziness of life.  
For future research on Myanmar, I would find it interesting to analyse how the transformation of 
Myanmar from the ‘axis of evil’ to the aid darling of the West will, and already has to a still limited 
degree, introduce new techniques, rationales and authorities for state territorialisation. Already, the 
military is working with international finance institutions and the development aid industry to 
establish a neoliberal order in the country. The country’s political and social conditions are 
transformed to make it lucrative to Western businesses to invest and tap into Asia’s ‘final frontier’, 
full of natural resources. (Woods 2013, 1.) For the upland farmers, it will most likely mean more 
territorialized state power, more dispossession and more concessions. It hardly makes any difference 
if they go to Western or Chinese companies; either way, the traditional spatial organisation and 
sociospatial practices are increasingly replaced by a modern state territoriality. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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